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Chapter One:
Introduction: Locke on Moral and Political Obligation
I. Introduction
Locke’s theories of moral and political obligation are instructive both in their
successes and in their failures. Writing during a time in which previous assumptions were
being widely challenged in science, religion, and politics, Locke resists this trend and
judiciously accepts the wisdom of his predecessors as a firm foundation upon which to
build his own arguments. Nonetheless, both Locke’s theory of moral obligation and his
theory of political obligation meet with serious criticism. On the moral obligation side,
Locke faces the charge of internal inconsistency: his theory of natural law cannot meet
the standards set by his naturalist empiricism. On the political obligation side, critics
complain that consent theory is descriptively inadequate: if citizens could consent to their
governments, then they would be morally bound, but most citizens have never consented
nor have they ever been in a position to perform a genuine act of consent. So two of
Locke’s crucial arguments seem to be in trouble. In my dissertation, I take another look at
these criticisms.
In the first half of the dissertation, I argue that though Locke’s natural law theory
is too vague to count as a decisive theory of moral obligation, he could enrich his account
using features of a Kantian approach in order to develop a coherent and internally
consistent theory of moral obligation. In the second half, I build upon this comprehensive
theory of moral obligation in order to argue for a more charitable interpretation of
Locke’s theory of political obligation, which I think survives the toughest objections to
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consent theory. According to my view, although consent is necessary and sufficient for
political obligation, there are nonetheless universal moral constraints upon the individual
choice to consent. Thus, though it is true that individuals are bound to obey only those
political institutions to which they have consented, there is a natural moral duty1 to
consent when certain conditions are met. If I am correct, Locke comes closer to having a
unified theory of obligation than most scholars give him credit for. By developing a
credible theory of moral obligation, which Locke can then use to defend himself against
critics of his consent theory of political obligation, I provide Locke with the tools to save
both projects.

II. Part I: Moral Obligation
Because Locke never published a treatise on morality, the challenging task of
understanding his thoughts concerning moral obligation requires fitting together different
pieces from different works. My main argument, though, focuses upon Locke’s
unpublished manuscript, later edited and titled Essays on the Law of Nature by W. von
Leyden,2 in which Locke sketches his early theory of natural law. According to his
argument in the Essays, it is possible for human beings to discover the content of the
universal moral law through the use of reason operating upon experience provided by
sense perception. He envisions the process working in something like the following way:
1

Although some, such as R.B. Brandt (1964) and H.L.A. Hart (1958), have thought it important to
distinguish between duties and obligations, the former referring to natural obligations and the latter
referring to obligations that must be voluntarily acquired, I use the two terms interchangeably throughout
the dissertation.
2

First published in 1954 by Oxford University Press.
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recognizing regularities in nature, e.g., the changing of the seasons, we infer that nature is
governed by certain fixed laws; and further, we infer that human beings, as part of nature,
must also be governed by certain fixed laws. But also, recognizing differences between
human beings and the rest of nature—the most important of which being the human
capacity for rational thought—we infer that human beings are governed not only by
physical laws but also by moral laws. Still, from this picture, we get only a basic sense of
Locke’s moral theory. He must say much more in order to explain how human beings
come to know the content of the natural law.
Though he struggled throughout his career to further develop this empiricist
natural law theory into a theory of moral obligation that would fit with his metaphysics,
epistemology, and religious beliefs, he never manages to fill in the details of his early
theory. Beyond the issue of knowability, he also struggles with the problem of
normativity. Even if Locke could explain how human beings come to know the natural
law, he must also explain why it is binding upon them. Here Locke vacillates between
two possibilities: either the natural moral law has authority because it is the manifestation
of God’s perfect will or because it is somehow intrinsically binding upon rational human
beings who are capable of discovering it. Unfortunately, both Locke’s explanation for
how human beings come to know the content of the natural moral law and his
explanation for why they are bound to obey its commands are incomplete. Thus, in part I
(chapters two and three), I suggest a direction for filling out Locke’s skeletal theory of
moral obligation.
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In chapter two, I look carefully at those natural law theories that most influenced
Locke’s own distinctive natural law theory with the hope that these theories might
provide us with clues as to the direction that Locke was heading. As a result, the aim of
this chapter is to place Locke’s moral theory in its historical context and to examine the
main interpretive debate springing from this analysis.
Locke witnessed, during his lifetime, a shift in emphasis between the Scholastic
theory of natural law to the modern theory of natural rights. In his own moral theory, we
see evidence that Locke wishes to mediate this split. Although he maintains, along with
the Scholastics, the view that there is a pre-existing moral theory handed down by the
supreme lawgiver, he also attempts to follow some of the Protestant figures and other of
his contemporaries in agreeing that individuals have certain moral rights. From the older
conception of natural law, Locke borrows the idea of man’s subordination to a law, which
is, in a sense, internal to him, though he rejects the Scholastic contention that the law is
known by revelation or otherwise written on one’s heart. Agreeing with the relatively
recent trend toward secularizing the natural law, as first seen in the work of Grotius and
later taken to its logical conclusion in Hobbes’s Leviathan, Locke argues that the natural
law must be known by human reason or “the light of nature.” But whereas Hobbes’s
commitment to developing a secularized natural law theory leads him to an unlimited,
though morally and politically decisive, natural right, Locke sees individuals as
partaking, through their reasoning capacities, in a moral or divine natural law, which
places certain limits upon their natural rights.
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From the pre-Socratics and Aristotle, Locke adopts the notion of a hierarchy of
being according to which the essential feature of human nature is the ability to control
one’s passions by allowing reason to guide one’s desires. However, the ancient account
of morality and natural justice seems to be missing a crucial element of natural law
theory, a concept of natural duty. The Stoics supply this missing element and are the first
to develop a complete theory of natural law recognizable as such. Unlike their
predecessors, the Stoics take a cosmic view of what it means to be a human being as one
who ought to live in accordance with nature. Therefore, the Stoics supply the idea that
there is an objective right or system of law (i.e., reason) that supplies individuals with a
duty to take others into consideration. Thus, Locke borrows from the Stoics the notion
that living well involves more than simply individual success or human flourishing;
living well also requires living in accordance with the natural order of things. However,
Locke importantly breaks from the Stoic’s deterministic, physicalist view of the natural
law, accepting the view that the natural law is a moral law given by the divine lawgiver
and is external to and discoverable by human beings.
This break with Stoic determinism marks Locke’s acceptance of an aspect of yet
another natural law theory, that of the Scholastics. Locke accepts the Scholastic notion
that God creates and lends authority to the natural moral law. For Aquinas, man tends
toward his natural end, which God has built into his very nature. Unlike the Stoics,
Aquinas thinks that human beings ought to obey the natural law precisely because it is
the manifestation of the divine will. Here Aquinas articulates the principle of divine right:
God, as the omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient creator of the universe, has proper
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authority and dominion over his creation giving him a right to rule, which Locke accepts
as well. So, in some passages, Locke seems to accept the voluntarism of the Scholastics,
but in others he seems to side with the early Protestant thinkers such as Hugo Grotius,
offering a more secularized justification for the authority of the natural law.
Given Locke’s ambiguous and multi-faceted notion of the natural law, it is
difficult to understand how he views the relationship between natural law and natural
rights. Indeed, it is difficult to know whether he has a unified view about it at all. It is no
wonder, then, that Locke scholars seize upon the opportunity for an interpretive debate.
On one side, arguing that Locke’s view is essentially the same as Hobbes’s, is Leo
Strauss. Strauss says that, for Locke, natural rights are prior to the natural law and the
state of nature is a state of unlimited freedom ruled only by the natural right of selfpreservation. On the other side are those such as John Dunn, James Tully, and Richard
Ashcraft, who argue that the natural law is prior to natural rights and that natural rights
derive from the natural law. Yet, recently, A. John Simmons advocates a third
interpretation arguing that both natural law and natural rights are fundamental in Locke’s
view. I agree with Simmons’s interpretation because I see no clear indication that Locke
wishes to privilege either the principles of natural law or natural rights. Unfortunately,
this interpretation gives us little insight into potential directions to expand Locke’s
theory.
From here, my daunting task in chapter three is to take the muddled beginnings of
a natural law theory that Locke offers in his early work and form them into a coherent
theory of moral obligation. However, it becomes increasingly evident that in order to
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develop a comprehensive theory of moral obligation, Locke needs significant help from
others. I argue that Kant’s theory of moral obligation can supply the crucial elements that
Locke needs.
There are two main barriers to Locke having a credible theory of moral
obligation, to which I have already alluded. He fails to answer two important questions:
(1) how can human beings discover their moral obligations? And (2) what gives the
natural law moral authority? First, Locke maintains that it is possible to deduce or derive
the moral law from sense data just as we might demonstrate the solution to a geometric
proof from the principles of geometry; however, he never successfully produces such a
moral demonstration. So initially, at least, the prospects look bleak for deriving
normative rules from physical facts about the world. Secondly, Locke gives two different
answers to the question about the natural law’s moral authority. Either the moral law is
binding because it is legislated by God (voluntarism) or it is binding because obedience
to the moral law is intrinsically good for rational human beings who are capable of
discovering it (realism). The problem here is that both responses seem to conflict with
Locke’s commitment to his naturalist empiricism. Thus, as it stands, Locke’s natural law
theory lacks crucial elements of a theory of moral obligation.
In the end, I argue that incorporating a broadly Kantian analysis of the Formula of
Humanity would provide Locke with an example of a deduction from observation and
reflection to a normative principle, i.e., a duty to respect humanity. Though it will require
Locke to relax slightly his commitment to empiricism, I think Kant’s rationalist
deduction is of the sort Locke ultimately had in mind. Also, though I think Kant and
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Locke are similarly imprecise about the source of moral authority, I find Christine
Korsgaard’s reconstruction of Kant’s conception of normativity both compelling in its
own right and not too far removed from Locke’s naturalist empiricism. By using certain
features of Kant’s moral theory to enrich Locke’s skeletal theory of natural law, I aim to
provide Locke with a coherent and internally consistent theory of moral obligation.

III. Part II: Political Obligation
Now having a comprehensive theory of moral obligation is important for the
success of Locke’s theory of political obligation as well because political obligation is a
subset of moral obligation. Locke himself seems to recognize this, since arguments in the
Second Treatise assume the existence of the law of nature as a premise. For example, in
chapter five, in the argument showing how one might justly come to own property that is
originally given by God to all mankind in common, Locke relies upon the following
principle of natural law: that God has given to man the faculty of reason to be used to his
best advantage. According to Locke, what follows from this is that man may acquire
property at will, but only so much as reason tells him he might make proper use of.
Hence, we see an example of a natural duty limiting a natural right. As we will later see,
Locke relies upon similar moral concepts to bolster claims throughout his political works.
Therefore, I argue that in order for Locke to have a plausible theory of political
obligation, he must build upon a plausible theory of moral obligation. Thus, in part II
(chapters four and five), I explore the implications of my reconstructed theory of moral
obligation for Locke’s political theory.
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Political philosophers from Rawls to Simmons uniformly interpret Locke as a
diehard consent theorist; it is vexing, however, that this nearly universal interpretation
relies upon only a few chapters of the Second Treatise of Government. I argue that
Locke’s views on political obligation are actually more complicated than the traditional
consent theory label suggests. Moreover, when we broaden our focus to include some of
his nonpolitical works, a new interpretation emerges featuring a natural duty to consent as
the foundation for his theory of obligation. To interpret Locke as a consent theorist
according to the standard view, then, is to ignore the complexities of Locke’s theory of
political obligation and its connection with his natural law theory of moral obligation.
In chapter four, I begin by raising a conceptual challenge and two interpretive
challenges to the standard consent theory view. First, supporters of consent theory cannot
explain how consent, as the justification for political obligation, can avoid giving too
much respect to those who fail to consent for immoral, irrational, and unprincipled
reasons. I call this objection the over-permissive objection. I also show that an appeal to
Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent cannot solve the problem. Second, we see natural duties
limiting individual consent in Locke’s argument against selling oneself into slavery and
in his conception of property acquisition calling into question Locke’s status as a strict
consent theorist. Next, I offer my reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of political obligation
arguing that were Locke to adopt a natural moral duty to consent, his theory of political
obligation would be more consistent with his other commitments. Accepting this natural
moral duty to consent, not only solves the two interpretive issues raised above, but it also
neatly fits with his view of the relationship between citizen and state and his defense of a
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remedial right to revolution. In addition to the interpretive advantages, such a
reinterpretation adequately responds to the conceptual challenge and, as I show in the
following chapter, gives Locke’s theory additional conceptual advantages over other
contemporary theories of political obligation.
I find support for this natural moral duty to consent in three sources. First, the
seeds of a theory of civil government according to which the state actually helps
individuals to fulfill their natural moral duties lie hidden in Locke’s description of human
nature and the state of nature. Second, if, as Locke contends in his theory of revolution in
an argument based upon natural law principles, there are conditions under which dissent
is obligatory, then it seems at least plausible that he would also accept that there are
conditions under which consent is obligatory. Third, adopting such a natural moral duty
could revive consent theory as a plausible solution to the problem of political obligation
and charity recommends that we ought to attribute to Locke the strongest argument that is
available. Therefore, we ought to make explicit the commitments that require Locke’s
acceptance of the natural moral duty to consent.
Finally, in chapter five, I move on from explaining my reinterpretation of Locke’s
consent theory to defending it as philosophically tenable in its own right. The
contemporary debate concerning what has been called the problem of political obligation
hopes to answer the following question: is there a moral duty to obey the law? This
debate surrounds the issue of discovering the normative grounding for political
obligation. Consent has been considered one plausible answer to the question because of
its intuitive appeal and similarity to the social practice of making promises; however, as
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we have seen, the consent theory of political obligation faces serious objections. I have
already discussed the conceptual problem of consent being overly permissive, but the
more common objection to consent theory is a practical one. While the principle of
consent, being derived from the freedom of individuals in the state of nature, is an
intuitively plausible way to explain the historical rise of political systems, critics are right
to point out that it cannot be the basis for a contemporary theory of political obligation
because it is impossible to show that most people, who are not born into the state of
nature (with the possible exception of naturalized citizens), consent to their particular
political systems. Unlike individuals dwelling in the state of nature, it looks like most do
not have the opportunity to choose their forms of government, especially given the
extreme costs of emigration. This is a practical objection to consent theory, which I refer
to as descriptive inadequacy.
In response to this objection, three groups have emerged: those who wish to
modify consent theory or to defend some other type of transactional account; those who
argue for a moral obligation to obey the law on the basis of associative or natural duties;
and anarchists who are not only convinced by the descriptive inadequacy objection to
consent theory, but also reject all other attempts to prove that there are independent moral
reasons to obey the law. They argue that though consent would theoretically justify the
individual moral obligation to obey the law, no other theory offers a suitably general
principle of morality that could explain one’s duty to obey the particular state of which
one is a member. I argue that because the anarchist challenge defeats all prevailing
contemporary theories of political obligation, consent theory deserves another look.
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My Lockeian account of political obligation responds to the anarchist challenge
because it provides a special duty to obey a particular state, being a voluntaristic account,
while also acknowledging the general moral duty to politically obligate oneself. It is the
natural duty to consent, which best respects autonomy, by allowing individuals to
voluntarily incur an obligation to obey a particular state, while at the same time
recognizing the duties that citizens owe to one another because it makes the responsibility
to accept the authority of a particular government part of what we owe to one another.
Therefore, in order to make Locke’s theory of political obligation more palatable, it
seems that he needs something like the natural moral duty to consent.
The position I advocate is Rawlsian in spirit. Rawls introduces the natural duty of
justice as the duty requiring us to “support and comply with just institutions that exist and
apply to us.”3 Because all human beings, regardless of their political allegiances owe a
general duty of justice to their fellow human beings, they must do whatever they can to
ensure that they act according to such a duty. However, this duty cannot meet the
anarchist’s particularity requirement because it does not explain why individuals have a
special duty to discharge their general duty of justice by obeying their particular state.
My Lockeian theory has the advantage here. I argue that though Rawls, and others, are
correct that (just) states are in a position to help citizens to fulfill their natural moral
duties, because the state gains moral authority only when individuals voluntarily agree to
accept certain limits to their autonomy, the natural duty of justice is not enough to give
individuals a moral obligation to obey the law. However, because we do have a natural

3

A Theory of Justice (1999), p. 99.
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moral obligation to do all that we can to fulfill our moral obligations, which we owe
especially to those in close proximity to us, we do have the further natural moral duty to
voluntarily politically obligate ourselves by consenting. Thus, individuals have a natural
duty to transfer moral authority to the state, which they owe to their fellow citizens.
While some have argued that Locke the philosopher and Locke the political
scientist ought to be carefully separated, such a view is clearly contrary to Locke’s own
intentions given that the foundation for his political philosophy is his theory of natural
law and natural rights. Also, examining Locke’s theory of morality and his theory of
political obligation in conjunction and the ways in which they influence one another
offers potentially valuable insight into Locke’s larger philosophical ambitions. Therefore,
an interpretive project paying equal attention to both of these aspects of Locke’s work is
long overdue.

13

Part I, Chapter Two:
Natural Law: The Search for Normativity
I. Introduction
The field of normative ethics has developed, largely within the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries, devoid of much debate about natural law theory. At least since the
publication of Smart and Williams’ Utilitarianism: For and Against4, the focus has been
upon the battle between consequentialists and deontologists and the attempt to find a
more palatable theory combining the best elements of both. If natural law theory is
mentioned at all, it is subsumed under virtue ethics. The main reason that serious
discussion of natural law as an independent moral theory has languished recently is that
many remain skeptical of its metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. Indeed,
natural law theorists themselves are deeply divided about how best to characterize human
nature (both metaphysically and epistemologically), even while maintaining that the
standard of moral and political conduct is to be determined by and discovered in the very
nature of human beings.
Most natural law theorists, following Aristotle and Aquinas, argue that rationality,
understood as intimately linked with virtue, is the distinctive function of human beings.
But others, following Hobbes, emphasize the quite regular failure of human beings to act
according to the above narrow conception of reason, understood as opposed to prudence,
and, as a result, find the passions or instinct to be a more accurate predictor and motivator
of human action. Yet, despite disagreement within the natural law tradition, the
4

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1973).
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theoretical aims of each distinctive approach coincide, such that it is possible to identify a
unified natural law theory. Natural law theory, broadly speaking, aims at discovering a
set of principles, which is based upon a theory of human nature and can guide human
action in an effort to attain what is best for human beings. But beyond the discovery of
moral principles, natural law theory strives to discover the origin and justification of
these principles. When done properly, it is at its core a theory of moral obligation.
Now, by far the most difficult conceptual question for a natural law theory of
moral obligation is how to derive moral rules from some set of relevant facts about the
world and human nature without falling prey to the naturalistic fallacy. Virtually every
natural law theory has been criticized for failing to answer this conceptual challenge
sufficiently and for making unjustifiable metaphysical or epistemological assumptions.
Thus, at least at the outset, skepticism about the possibility of developing a plausible
moral theory based upon the natural law seems warranted. Still, it seems to me that any
moral theory that makes claims about universal values, that is to say any moral theory,
cannot avoid making some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of its own. So,
that natural law theorists make such assumptions is far from a decisive criticism. True,
early natural law theorists had a very different view of crucial moral issues than we do
today. True, most natural law theorists did not question the existence of God and many
did not hesitate to use theological and teleological arguments. But we ought not let our
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skepticism about these issues deter us from the study of a theory that might very well
provide valuable insight into our own philosophical work.5
In what follows, I look closely at Locke’s distinctive brand of natural law theory
pointing out its strengths and weaknesses as well as the significance of his early moral
theory for his later political work. Locke is no exception among natural law theorists,
though I think he is more keenly aware of the skeptical opposition to natural law than
earlier natural law theorists had been. He struggles throughout his career to develop a
theory of moral obligation that would line up with his metaphysics, his epistemology, his
religious views, and his political philosophy.6 In 1660, Locke penned eight essays on the
law of nature, not published until long after his death under the title Essays on the Law of
Nature,7 representing his first attempt to lay down his thoughts about morality. Although
he never published these essays, or any other treatise on morality, it is evident that much
of his later work depends upon a theory of natural law. So my task in the following
chapter will be to discover whether one can build a coherent theory of moral obligation
5

Indeed, many of the debates taking place within normative ethics and meta-ethics today also concerned
early natural law theorists, for example, the debate between realists and non-realists, the controversies
regarding naturalism, intuitionism, and constructivism, the question of whether lawfulness or spontaneous
goodness is central to morality, and so on. By tracing back the history of such issues, we gain valuable
insight that helps us better to understand these contemporary debates (J.B. Schneewind. “Pufendorf’s Place
in the History of Ethics.” in Grotius, Pufendorf and Modern Natural Law. Knud Haakonssen (ed.).
Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co. (1999), p. 226). If nothing else, the history of natural law teaches
that we ought to think carefully about why human beings have generally thought themselves bound by
moral rules.
6

Locke believed that it must be possible to deduce the principles of natural law from the operation of
reason upon data provided by sense experience, but many have criticized him for never actually providing
such a demonstration. Locke seems aware of this shortcoming. He revisits the issue several times
throughout his career first, in the Essays on the Law of Nature; later, in the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1690); and finally, in the Reasonableness of Christianity (1695).
7

One of Locke’s earliest works, he wrote the eight essays in manuscript form during the early 1660’s,
probably 1664, but it remained unpublished until it was edited by W. von Leyden and published as the
Essays on the Law of Nature in 1954.
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from the bits and pieces that Locke offers throughout his corpus (and with a little help
from Kant). But before turning to Locke’s own theory of moral obligation in chapter
three, we first must understand the many forces that influenced his particular brand of
natural law. The main focus of this chapter, then, is first, to place Locke’s natural law
theory within its historical context and second, to examine the ongoing interpretive
debate regarding the relationship between natural duties and natural rights as it plays a
significant role in understanding the link between Locke’s theory of moral obligation and
his theory of political obligation.
Evidence suggests that Locke was influenced in varying degrees by nearly all of
the major theorists of natural law and natural rights from antiquity to his own lifetime.8 It
would be, however, tedious and unavoidably speculative to catalogue all of the possible
ways in which each of those theorists may have inspired the philosopher. Instead, I have
chosen to discuss only those whose work best demonstrates the historical shift that took
place between natural law and natural rights and those whose work most clearly guides
Locke’s unique theory of natural law and his doctrine of limited natural rights.
I begin, in section II, by examining the development of natural law thinking that
precedes Locke. There is clearly a shift among those who were most concerned with
questions of justice, or jus. Whereas the Scholastics were concerned with that which
would make individuals virtuous according to a pre-existing moral theory, the modern
theory of natural rights instead focuses upon the individual as an autonomous agent,

8

For a concise, yet comprehensive, summary of natural law theorists who influenced Locke’s thoughts on
the subject see von Leyden’s introduction to John Locke: Essays on the Law of Nature Oxford: Oxford
University Press (1954), pp. 30-43.
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naturally free to pursue morally permissible, though not necessarily morally required,
goals. Consequently, we find in Locke an attempt to mediate this split; I discuss his
attempt to do so in the third section. But Locke’s alleged ambiguity on the question of the
relationship between natural law and natural rights has spawned a debate among Locke
scholars, which I discuss in the fourth section. Ultimately, Locke needs a coherent theory
of moral obligation relating the individual’s natural freedom from others to both the
natural limits imposed by others’ natural freedom and the natural limits imposed by
God’s subjugation of mankind. But Locke never fully develops the moral theory that he
provides in his earliest writings. So in the next chapter, I show how Kant’s moral theory
could be the basis for a Lockeian theory of moral obligation that answers two important
questions: how human beings know the content of their moral duties and what justifies
the claims that morality makes upon us.

II. Locke’s Predecessors
In order to understand fully how Locke comes to articulate his moral theory, it is
important first to look more carefully at the history of natural law prior to the seventeenth
century and the important transition from natural law to natural rights. This tradition
greatly influenced Locke’s thoughts about the relationship between reason, justice, and
the laws of nature.
Although nothing resembling a complete theory of natural law was written until
the Hellenistic period, we find even in the work of the earliest Greek philosophers the
seeds of a structured natural law theory. Recognizing an inherent regularity in the world
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at large, the pre-Socratics deemed nature both metaphysically and philosophically prior to
man-made objects and institutions. So the notion of a hierarchy among natural and nonnatural goods was born.9 Consequently, subsequent ancient philosophers begin to explore
how man might best come into contact with the true nature of things, especially his own
true nature. Socrates and Plato answer that human beings ought to cultivate the parts
which participate most readily in the highest good, i.e., the unchanging, non-sensible,
ideal world, and work toward controlling the parts which keep them bound to the
uncertainties of the sensible world. Virtuous individuals, then, constantly strive to allow
reason to regulate their desires because reason is connected to that perfect ideal, while
desires for fleeting, material goods represent a void that can never be filled.10
Additionally, according to Aristotle, it is the human capacity for reason that distinguishes
men from beasts, which are solely ruled by their non-rational desires. It is in exercising
this capacity for self-regulation that one is most fully human.11 Hence, we see in the
ancient tradition the development of a hierarchy of being or nature, which later becomes
a central tenet of natural law theory.
Also, the above theory of human nature reflects another important ancient idea
that later natural law theorists adopt, Aristotle’s devotion to a general teleological theory
of nature. According to Aristotle’s teleology, everything in the universe can be described
9
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as dynamic, as constantly striving to attain its end. For human beings, the telos is virtue
or well-being, which requires fulfilling one’s function as a rational being to the greatest
extent possible; virtue or excellence means actively making the right decisions based
upon what right reason prescribes.12
From the ancient connection between reason and virtue, it is easy to see how a
theory of natural justice might arise. According to Aristotle, a human being cannot attain
excellence in isolation, but is by nature a political animal.13 So the polis in providing
protective laws, cultural life, and most importantly, moral education, offers the best
environment within which human beings might cooperate with one another, thrive
mutually, and develop the appropriate moral character. And just as each individual has a
telos, so does each state. Therefore, attaining justice within civil societies requires
discovering natural laws and making civil laws that best serve the function of that
particular civil society.
Aristotle’s teleology, his dynamic picture of human nature, his view of the ethical
end of the polis, and his moral understanding of law and justice lead him to recognize the
concepts of universal law and natural justice.14 However, these concepts do not yet
encapsulate a full theory of natural law. In Aristotle, natural justice remains subordinate
to the final end of the individual: happiness or well-being. Aristotle’s ethical picture,
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then, seems to be missing a crucial element of natural law theory: concern for others or
the common good from which springs a concept of natural duty.
The Stoics first supply this crucial element and build a complete theory of natural
law on the foundation laid by Plato and Aristotle. Like their predecessors, the Stoics
thought that the moral ideal was to live in harmony with nature including one’s own
nature; and since they equate nature and reason, living in harmony with nature means
living according to reason. However, the Stoic view of human nature differs importantly
from that of Plato and Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle equates what is good for human
beings with whatever allows them to flourish, e.g., health and education, the Stoics focus
upon ‘what is appropriate’ for human beings. In opposition to Aristotle, they recognize
that even things like health and education might not be beneficial for all individuals in all
circumstances (e.g., a well-educated tyrant does not benefit anyone). Therefore, only the
virtues, wisdom, prudence, justice, temperance, and courage, are truly called good.
Consequently, while the Stoics agree that, all things being equal, goods like health and
education are appropriate for me, they add that living among other rational human beings
is also a good that is appropriate for me and that taking others into consideration will
undoubtedly affect my choices about whatever allows me to flourish.15 Thus, the Stoics
recognize two basic and sometimes competing human inclinations: self-love and respect
for the concerns of others, which they believe to be the driving forces behind all virtues
and duties.
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On the one hand, when an individual follows her impulses, she seeks her own
satisfaction at the expense of all mankind; on the other hand, when she acts according to
duty, she follows the established order of the universe. But it is only right reason that can
establish order among these inclinations and give them the proper direction. Reason,
then, is the unwritten law in the nature of the world and in human nature:
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal
application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its
commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does
not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though
neither have any effect on the wicked.16
Like Aristotle, the Stoics thought that living in accordance with reason meant living a life
of virtue, but they go so far as to say that there is no virtue without reason’s insight and
direction. Therefore, the Stoics supply a crucial element of natural law, the idea that there
is an objective right or system of law (i.e., reason) that supplies individuals with a duty to
take others into consideration. Notice that this notion of the objective right is different
from Plato and Aristotle’s view of the objective good as that which is good for the
individual soul. The Stoics take a wider view of what it means to be a human being as
one who ought to live in accordance with nature, where living in accordance with nature
means living in agreement with the predetermined unfolding of the natural law.
In the Scholastic tradition, Augustine and others further build upon the Stoic
theme of living in accordance with the natural order of things, but here end the
similarities between the Stoics and the Scholastics. Augustine’s notion of divine reason
16
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as belonging to the will of a personal God, who transcends nature, directly opposes the
Stoic concept of an impersonal reasoning force permeating the whole universe and
determining the natural order of things.17 As a result, Augustine argues that human
beings, using reason and free will, ought to follow divine reason, which is the source of
every good and value including the natural law. In a moment we shall see how this idea
of the natural law emanating from the divine will plays a crucial role in the transition
from natural law to natural rights.
Because of the Scholastics’ theological commitments, which are inescapably
linked to their view of natural law, the stoic idea of objective right takes on a very
different meaning in the Middle Ages.18 For the Scholastics, natural law takes a decidedly
legalistic turn. God determines what is objectively right and makes his decrees known in
the content of the natural law. As the creator of the universe, God has the right and the
power to sanction those who fail to fulfill their obligations. We shall later see Locke
siding with the Scholastics against the Stoics on this point insofar as he partially defines
natural law as a divine decree of God rather than a mechanistic system of natural reason.
Now let us turn to the most prominent natural law theorist in the Scholastic
tradition, Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas accepts Augustine’s voluntarism (his understanding
of natural law as binding because it is willed by God) and is clearly influenced by the
theology of the early Church Fathers, but he also adopts Aristotle’s principle of teleology
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blending these three elements together to create his own theory of natural law. For
Aquinas, man tends toward his natural end, which God has built into his very nature. He
famously defines the natural law as “participation of the eternal law in the rational
creature,”19 by which he means to explain that there is an eternal law that is God’s plan
for the universe and all of creation participates in this eternal plan, in ways appropriate to
its specific kind. But just what is this specific end toward which man strives? In contrast
to the ancients, Aquinas does not describe it as a single end or object, such as happiness,
well-being, or virtue, rather he says that all things toward which human beings are
naturally inclined are understood by reason as being good and their contraries as evil.20
He offers a list, though probably incomplete, of examples of what he takes to be natural
inclinations: to preserve oneself, to procreate, to know God, to live in society, and to
develop all of one’s faculties, particularly the intellect, whose object is truth.21 Hence,
natural law is the “natural inclination to [man’s] proper act and end.”22 It is this natural
end, along with God’s commands made known in the natural law, that dictates a system
of objective right (i.e., what one can rightly do) according to Aquinas.
From this picture of natural law and natural right, we see how a system of
subjective or individual rights, though far from the highly developed views of natural
rights we later find in the sixteenth century, might begin to emerge. Aquinas’s
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voluntarism provides new ground for the obligation to obey the natural law setting up a
relationship between rights-holder (i.e., God) and duty-bearer (i.e., an individual human
being). Unlike the Stoics, Aquinas thinks that human beings ought to obey the natural law
precisely because it is the manifestation of the divine will. Here Aquinas articulates the
principle of divine right: God, as the omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient creator of
the universe, has proper authority and dominion over his creation giving him a right to
rule. This right to rule creates corresponding duties for his subjects, both with regard to
their creator and with regard to one another. Thus, Aquinas’s principle of divine right
introduces an element of subjectivity into the stoic understanding of objective right.
However, he does not go so far as to acknowledge genuine subjective rights for
individual human beings, in the liberal sense, for instance, because Aquinas does not
think that a system of right or law can exist independent of a theory of the good.23
Consequently, if an individual, subjective right is to have any legal or moral force, it must
be a dictate of right reason; and since God is the only being who always acts perfectly in
accordance with the dictates of right reason, he is the only individual with subjective
rights.
The modern period in the history of natural law features the rise of the idea of
genuine individual rights and a reaction against both Stoic and Scholastic approaches to
natural law. Just prior to Locke’s most productive period, Francisco Suarez (1547-1617)
and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), both important transitional figures in the history of
natural law, did much to explain the relationship between objective and subjective senses
23
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of right. They point out that the original Latin term, jus, has two meanings: (a) that which
is just or objectively right as in a system of law; and (b) that which signifies a subjective
right, i.e., what belongs to one individual to the exclusion of all others, as in a personal
right.24 In other words, in dealing with questions of right and law, a distinction ought to
be made between the right by which one acts in a certain way and the right to act in a
certain way. It is this second sense of jus that Aquinas fails to recognize.
Suarez, as a committed Thomist, crafts a natural law theory, which makes use of
the subjective sense of jus suggesting that Aquinas could have consistently supported the
idea of subjective rights.25 When Aquinas defines a right objectively as that which one
can rightly do, i.e., that which one is allowed to do, thereby creating spheres of right
within which individuals may permissibly act, he also inadvertently carves out some
individual subjective rights. If, for example, I have a duty under the natural law to refrain
from killing innocent people because killing innocents is outside of the sphere of
permissible action, then it follows that all innocent people have a corresponding right (a
“claim-right,” in Hohfeldian terms) not to be attacked, which they hold against me.
However, not every objective right entailed by the natural law must have a corresponding
subjective right. If, to use one of Aquinas’s examples, I have a duty to worship God, it is
difficult to see what subjective right might correspond to my duty. It looks as if the
obvious answer is that it is God’s right to be worshipped that corresponds to my duty and,
indeed, this is consistent with what I have already mentioned above about Aquinas’s
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assertion of the divine right to rule. But, it makes little sense to talk about God having
claim-rights, in the Hofeldian sense, because our duties do not simply correspond to
God’s subjective rights; rather, our duties derive from God’s divine right.26 Suarez, then,
cannot claim that every objective right (i.e., moral duty) under the natural law
corresponds to some subjective right. Instead, he must make the more modest claim that
some duties under the natural law imply individual rights.
But notice, also, that the rights under consideration here are not natural rights in
anything like the Hobbesian sense, i.e., prior to the natural law or independent of a theory
of the good; rather, we should understand these rights in the Thomistic sense, as
stemming from the natural law itself. As a result, on Suarez’s view, there can be no right
to do evil because the natural law sets boundaries within which individuals have a right to
do certain good things. Therefore, Suarez keeps Aquinas’s idea that natural rights define
the boundaries within which individuals may permissibly act, while observing that such
demarcation also creates some individual, subjective rights for those who may be affected
by my actions.
As an illustration of the above, let us look at the Thomistic theory of property in
contrast to a liberal theory of property rights. On the one hand, the Thomists believe that
because God gives all people common dominion over the earth and all things upon it, all
property is naturally common. Now this makes certain actions impermissible for me; it
seems clear that, since everyone shares ownership, I ought not interfere with others’
attempts to make use of this common property. Hence, a natural right arises: “a right not
26
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to be interfered with in the acquiring of property.”27 But it is important to notice that this
is far from advancing a liberal theory of private property rights. On the Thomistic theory,
private ownership only occurs as an addition to the natural law. In other words, only
human law can create an individual right to acquire property as one’s own; thus, it only
makes sense to talk about private property within the context of civil society, governed
by civil laws. On the other hand, according to Locke’s radically modern theory of a right
to private property, it is possible to change the natural ownership status of a piece of
property from commonly owned to privately owned by mixing one’s naturally owned
labor with the land. Private property is an integral part of the natural law on Locke’s
view. So we see the stark contrast between the medieval focus upon the common good
and the modern focus upon individualism.28
Grotius, unlike Suarez, rejects all three elements of the Thomistic theory of
natural rights: the voluntarism, the teleological approach to natural law, and the appeals
to theological arguments, instead choosing to treat natural law within a purely
philosophical framework.29 To fully understand Grotius’s theory of natural rights, it is
important to begin with a bit of context. Writing during the time of the Thirty Years’ War
(1618-1648), Grotius personally observed the lack of restraint in war and thought that
there was a special need to study the ethical and legal aspects of war; and, according to
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Grotius, one cannot adequately study the ethics of war without first studying natural law
and the law of nations.30 Further, taking into account the growing need within a European
society, increasingly wracked by religious wars, for a moral theory detached from
sectarian doctrine, Grotius argues that the validity of reasoning concerning natural law
should and does stand up to scrutiny even if God does not exist: “all we have now said
would take place, though we should even grant, what without the greatest Wickedness
cannot be granted, that there is no God, or that he takes no Care of human Affairs.”31
Consequently, Grotius turns to the human desire for social interaction and the need for
societal order as the basis for his moral theory.
In answer to a common objection to his theory, Grotius rejects the notion that
private interest, rather than a regard for justice or virtue, rules human beings in all of their
actions finding that the root of human conduct is rationality and sociability, which
naturally lead individuals to establish mutually just relationships. There is no doubt that
expediency or prudence motivates some to join together and form communities for their
mutual benefit, but this is only a superficial description of human conduct. In fact, human
beings look to one another to satisfy a more primal need for companionship even when
30
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there is no immediate advantage to be gained. As Grotius says: “the Mother of Natural
Law is human Nature itself, which, though even the Necessity of our Circumstances
should not require it, would of itself create in us a mutual Desire of Society.”32
Grotius’s argument for this account of human action is reminiscent of Aristotle’s
function argument. But, like the Stoics before him, Grotius’s understanding of human
nature is very different from Aristotle’s. Grotius has a much expanded notion of the
essential features of human nature. When he searches for the aspect of human nature that
separates human beings from all other animals, he emphasizes that human beings have
been created with a desire for society, facilitated by the capacity for speech and the
ability to know and act in accordance with general moral principles. Thus, each human
being as a social and moral agent is the proper subject of natural law.
Having grounded natural law in the sociable and moral aspects of human nature,
then, Grotius goes on to offer his definition of this law: he says,
Natural Right is the Rule and Dictate of Right Reason, shewing the Moral
Deformity or Moral Necessity there is in any Act, according to its
Suitableness or Unsuitableness to a reasonable Nature, and consequently,
that such an Act is either forbid or commanded by God, the Author of
Nature.33
What distinguishes the natural law from other laws, and Grotius’s definition of natural
law from Aquinas’s, is that Grotius’s natural law demands acts that are, by their very
nature, obligatory and forbids those acts that are, by their very nature, unlawful. Just as
the necessary characteristics of things remain basically unchanged from the moment of
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their existence, so too the necessary characteristics of human nature remain basically
unchanged. It follows, then, that actions judged by right reason to agree with human
nature are always good and actions judged to disagree are always bad.34 The above
passage demonstrates one of Grotius’s important breaks with his scholastic predecessors.
Grotius rejects voluntarism arguing that it is the independent reasonableness of the
natural law, rather than the will of God, which binds human beings to obey the law. This
new theory about the bindingness of natural law, called intellectualism or realism, paves
the way for the modern view of individual rights most familiar to us today. Natural law
binds human beings precisely because it is a law that corresponds to the nature of human
beings qua human beings. It prescribes what is permissible and impermissible for human
beings; thus, creating both natural (or human) duties and rights under that law.
Now I turn to the natural law theory of another influential early Protestant thinker
and follower of Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf.35 Unlike previous natural law theorists,
Pufendorf adopts the distinctively modern thought that the origin of the natural law is
irrelevant for analyzing the nature of law itself and human beings’ obligation to obey that
law. Pufendorf accuses his predecessors of indulging in metaphysical speculation and
wishes instead, to shift the focus away from that which morally justifies our obedience to
the law to the more practical study of the actual working legal system. So in order to get
at what he sees as the heart of the matter, Pufendorf is happy to accept, without much
discussion, some metaphysical assumptions, namely that God is the creator of the natural
34
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law who guarantees that human beings will discover, through their rational natures, the
reasonableness of that law.36 According to Pufendorf, understanding the concept of legal
obligation, whose principles are inherent in the concept of legality itself, is the truly
important issue.37 All other basic concepts of morality derive from the concept of law.
For Pufendorf, human beings have an intuitive, not necessarily moral, sense of
obligation that guides them when they make ordinary agreements and without this sense
of obligation, the institution of legal contracts and agreements simply would not exist.
Obligation, then, at base is a social relation in which one person directs the actions of
another and ought to be distinguished from advice and coercion, where the one directing
the actions of another has no real power over him, in the first case, because the one being
directed is free to act or not according to his desire and, in the second, because the one
directing has no right to require certain actions of the other. By contrast, obligation
requires that the commanding power have good reasons to demand that the actions of the
one being directed be limited, which when combined with the superior’s ability to reward
and punish, produce within reasonable creatures a combination of reverence and fear.
This is just what it means to be obligated, the one demanding something of me has a right
to demand it because he can offer good reasons for his demand; and, if I disregard his
right to rule over me, then I expect and fear just punishment.38 But, says Pufendorf,
reverence alone ought to be sufficient for one to recognize his obligation to the superior
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on the grounds of good judgment.39 Once one recognizes that he is obligated to obey
some command, the inherent sense of obligation takes over, so that the fear of
punishment no longer motivates me to obey the command. Rather, I act upon my
recognition of the reasonableness of the command according to my own free will.
Now Pufendorf admits that this picture does not always work as a justification for
one’s obligations to the natural law because the reasons for that law are not always
immediately available to rational human beings who have only a limited perspective on
the universe. Ultimately, Pufendorf thinks of morality as deontologically based, although
he accepts a teleological picture of the universe as the justification for natural law from
the perspective of an omniscient being. Therefore, because human beings cannot fully
grasp the justification of the moral law, we must instead study positive law separately as
a working model and metaphor for the natural law. As a result, Pufendorf argues that
legal and moral language only makes sense within the context of the assumptions and
principles of a working legal system.40 In other words, without law no act would count as
morally or legally pernicious. This view opposes Grotius’s natural law theory, which
argues that obligation springs directly from our rational human nature. But Pufendorf
does not completely abandon human reason because it is our rational nature that
determines the bounds of legal and moral claims in the first place.
So Pufendorf walks a fine line between the positions of Grotius and Hobbes. On
the one hand, Pufendorf does not go as far as Grotius and the Stoics saying that the law of
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nature is the dictate of right reason and entirely independent of divine command, nor, on
the other hand, does he accept Hobbes’s view that the natural law is purely prudential.
Instead, Pufendorf maintains the existence of the natural law as the grounds for political
obligation, while he accepts the artificial aspect of political society. He regards the study
of law as an autonomous discipline and the laws themselves as a set of rules grounded in
reason.41
Finally, before turning to Locke’s own view of the relationship between the
natural law and natural rights, I briefly examine Thomas Hobbes’s contribution to the
transition between natural law and natural rights. Hobbes is arguably the most influential
figure participating in this modern debate; he is especially important given the context of
understanding Locke’s attempt to mediate the two positions.42 Additionally, Hobbes puts
forth a radical theory of political philosophy that continues to shape the field even today.
Breaking more decisively with the Scholastic natural law tradition than anyone yet
mentioned, Hobbes rejects both natural law (in the sense of a transcendent moral law or
theory of the good) as necessary for the existence of natural rights and the Thomistic
teleological framework. But at the same time, Hobbes embraces traditional natural law
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terminology using it to found the modern doctrine of natural rights, which later becomes
a key feature of modern liberalism.43
Yet, Hobbes’s methodology is not the only unconventional aspect of his political
philosophy. Because he rejects the notion of a transcendent moral law that governs
human actions and dictates individual rights, understanding the role of natural rights in
Hobbes’s political philosophy also requires challenging traditional norms. For Hobbes,
individual rights do not necessarily correspond to other individual duties; his most
fundamental rule of nature, that everyone has “the right to everything,” for example, does
not entitle the right-holder to noninterference because that would be a logical
contradiction.44 Indeed, though it seems inconsistent, Hobbes’s extreme individualism
and contention that the natural state of man is a state of absolute liberty, leads him also to
advocate the absolute power of the state over the individual because this absolutist
picture of the state is the only possible means to ensure peace, i.e., the only condition
guaranteeing the safety and security of all against the perils of the state of nature. So
individual claim-rights with corresponding duties are not natural, but artificial.45
According to Hobbes, it is precisely the urgent need to protect the natural right to selfpreservation that justifies an authoritarian state and the rejection of individual liberty
rights within civil society. This creates an unusual tension within Hobbes’s work:
figuring out how to combine an authoritarian political theory with an individualistic one.
Hobbes’s answer is, of course, the social contract.
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In this section, I have outlined the key contributions of Locke’s predecessors to
the natural law debate. This discussion serves as the background against which we may
understand Locke’s own place within the debate. As we shall next see, Locke draws upon
many of the theorists mentioned above in developing his own theory about the
relationship between natural law and natural rights.

III. Locke’s Doctrine of Limited Natural Rights
I now turn to Locke’s own thoughts about natural law and natural rights. Because
Locke can be read as a moderator of sorts endorsing some aspects of each of the above
theories and rejecting others, the greatest difficulty he and his interpreters face is
portraying his ideas as unambiguous and consistent. This is not an easy task. Still, I think
we may find in Locke a common thread running through his work without which there
would be no complete picture. This common thread is what I refer to as the doctrine of
limited natural rights.
From the older conception of natural law, Locke borrows the idea of man’s
subordination to a law, which is, in a sense, internal to him, though he rejects the
Scholastic contention that the law is known by revelation or otherwise written on one’s
heart. Agreeing with the relatively recent trend toward secularizing the natural law, as
first seen in the work of Grotius and later taken to its logical conclusion in Hobbes’s
Leviathan, Locke argues that the natural law must be known by reason or “the light of
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nature.”46 But whereas Hobbes’s commitment to developing a secularized natural law
theory leads him to an unlimited, though morally and politically decisive, natural right,
Locke sees individuals as partaking, through their reasoning capacities, in a moral or
divine natural law, which limits their natural rights. So Locke understands unlimited
rights to be just as dangerous as unlimited rule and seeks a doctrine that strikes the
correct balance between the power of citizens and the power of the state.
To this end, let us look at the specific ways in which the natural law tradition
influences Locke’s work. First, Locke refers directly to the Stoic notion of natural law in
the first book of the Essays equating the natural law with “that single good” which the
Stoics thought was most praiseworthy, namely virtue.47 Here Locke affirms his
agreement with the general ancient belief in a universal standard for living well given in
nature, but he also asserts his agreement with the Stoics, in contrast to Aristotle, that
living well requires more than simply individual flourishing.
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However, though Locke’s view of natural law and virtue often sounds similar to
that of the Stoics,48 he also makes an important distinction that the Stoics do not. Locke
distinguishes between right reason as “principles of action from which spring all virtues
and whatever is necessary for the proper moulding of morals” and the faculty of reason in
human beings, which “forms trains of thought and deduces proofs.”49 This is an
important distinction because for Locke the law of nature must be a decree of divine will,
which is discovered by human reason, rather than a deterministic system of scientific law;
otherwise, Locke argues, the commands and prohibitions of the natural law would be in
vain. As it stands, the Stoic’s deterministic view of the natural law is unjust because it
cannot account for why bad things happen to good people. But the natural law must be
just, says Locke, if it is to be a reasonable guide to human action and given that the world
contains so much apparent injustice, only a natural law that comes from God, who
guarantees punishment for the wicked and rewards for the virtuous in the afterlife will be
properly just.50 Therefore, the law of nature is not the universal order of which human
nature is merely a part; but it is a moral law given by a divine lawgiver, external to
human beings, out in the world to be discovered by human reason.51 Thus, we see Locke
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using the voluntarism introduced by the Scholastics to correct for what he sees as lacking
in the Stoic view of natural law.
Additionally, Locke’s attempt to bring together different strands of natural law
theory can be seen perhaps nowhere clearer than in his discussions about how human
beings come to know the natural law. Although throughout the Essays Locke affirms
Thomistic voluntarism embodied by the tenet that God both creates and lends obligatory
force to the natural law, he also denies the equally Thomistic idea that one can gain
knowledge of the laws of nature from tradition and faith.52 The early Locke is thoroughly
empiricist regarding the question of the capacity for human beings to know the natural
law. Indeed, this is the most novel aspect of Locke’s own natural law theory: that moral
laws are capable of demonstration and knowable through the operation of human reason
upon data gained by sense experience. John Hancey captures Locke’s thinking quite well
when he says: “Man was to be judged by a sovereign God, according to the law of nature.
Therefore, it was only logical that the law be promulgated in such a manner as to make it
intelligible to all who sought an understanding of it and the obligations it imposed.”53 In
the Essays, Locke identifies only one path to knowledge of the natural law, the light of
nature.54 He says further that since the light of nature “is neither tradition nor some
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inward moral principle written in our minds by nature, there remains nothing by which it
can be defined but reason and sense-perception.”55
Yet, when the later, more mature, Locke seriously considers whether the law of
nature is universally known, he admits that not everyone is capable of knowing the
universal law using the light of nature alone and for these, belief may be the only path to
knowledge of the natural law.56 So Locke appears to move back toward a more Thomistic
view later in life, conceding the value of tradition and faith for those who are incapable or
unwilling to use their reasoning faculty.57 Locke’s slide from optimism about an
empiricist theory of human knowledge of moral principles to a somewhat reluctant
accommodation of tradition and revelation may indicate disillusionment with the capacity
of human reason to grasp moral principles or it may indicate disappointment in his own
method of conceptual analysis as a means to understanding the moral law. But whatever
the reason for the shift in thought, it creates a disturbing tension, since the idea that the
natural law is discoverable by reason and based upon empirical evidence is one of the
most distinctive features of Locke’s natural law moral theory. And the early Locke, at
least, believes that the possibility of discovering the moral law beginning from a morally
neutral foundation is key to producing a plausible natural law theory. We will more
thoroughly examine this important point in the following chapter.
Despite Locke’s late slide back toward a more traditional theological
understanding of how one might come to know the content of the natural law, earlier in
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his career, we find the Protestant thinkers predominantly shaping Locke’s view. Locke
may have been inspired by both Grotius and Pufendorf in his description of the law of
nature in the Second Treatise: “Reason, which is that Law [i.e., the law of nature],
teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”58 From this early
version of the harm principle, it apparently follows that man is “bound to preserve
himself” and “to preserve the rest of Mankind” assuming, as Locke seems to, that failing
to harm someone in his life, health, liberty, and possessions is the same as preserving
him. Here we see Locke following Grotius and Pufendorf in offering a more secularized
justification for obedience to the natural law. However, if Locke, were to take this route,
he, like all moral realists, would need to face an important question: how can reason
discover the content of natural moral laws, e.g., that we ought not harm others? But
Locke would face an even more difficult challenge: explaining how reason can discover
the content of natural moral laws using empirical evidence alone. A critic, such as
Hobbes, would object that the empirical evidence points in precisely the opposite
direction: reason teaches us that there are no natural duties only natural rights. When we
look around the world, we observe that the only rule seems to be survival or selfpreservation and this description of human interaction is almost certain to include
harming others in some way. Even Locke himself repeats several times that many people
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do not seem to recognize the natural law,59 so it is clearly not self-evident and Locke has
not yet shown that the natural moral law is demonstrable from sense experience.
To these critics, then, Locke has no plausible response. Indeed, it is difficult to see
how he might square his acceptance of Scholastic voluntarism with his empiricist
epistemology. His best attempt seems to involve providing an empiricist proof for God’s
existence, an astonishingly weak design argument, from which he derives the duty to
preserve oneself and others.60 Because man is the “workmanship” of God, human beings
do not actually own their own bodies, so the duty to preserve oneself and one’s fellow
human beings is a debt of gratitude owed to the “one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise
Maker.”61 But this is not convincing given that presumably even fewer people recognize
the existence of God than recognize the harm principle or the duty of self-preservation.
That Locke does not successfully demonstrate how reason provides the content of our
duties is one great barrier to his development of a consistent natural law theory of moral
obligation.
In the following chapter, I show how something similar to Kant’s secular moral
theory could fill the gap for Locke making consistent his natural law theory. But as it
stands we find an awkward fit in Locke’s development of a theory that incorporates both
aspects of a natural law theory and aspects of a natural rights theory. Thus, it should be
unsurprising that the interpretive battle, which I discuss in the next section, continues to
rage.
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IV. Natural Law and Natural Rights in Locke’s Work
Having examined the tradition out of which Locke develops his early moral
theory, let us now turn to the role that natural law and natural rights play in Locke’s own
theory. Since von Leyden’s publication of Locke’s Essays, interpreters of Locke have
been divided regarding the following question: are natural rights prior to or derivative of
the natural law for Locke? Leo Strauss is the most prominent member of the former camp
arguing that Locke is a radical individualist whose political theory is essentially the same
as Hobbes’s.62 On this interpretation, human beings are born with unlimited freedom and
political life is a social construct designed merely for the sake of protecting and
promoting the primary natural right of self-preservation.63 So, Strauss attempts to show
that Locke’s natural law is actually a Hobbesian rule of self-preservation based on one’s
natural right, not on obedience to the moral law or divine law. On the other side, John
Dunn, James Tully, and Richard Ashcraft argue that natural law is the true basis of
Locke’s political theory and that individual rights derive from the natural law.64 These
interpreters stress Locke’s deeply religious worldview and his appeals to natural law
within his political theory.
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More recently, A. John Simmons argues that neither group interprets Locke
correctly.65 On Simmons’s view, natural rights and the natural law are equally
fundamental for Locke because human beings, born into a world in which God places
certain limits on their freedom, have both rights and duties naturally. This marks the
crucial distinction between Hobbes and Locke. Since on Hobbes’s view there are no
(moral) duties in the state of nature, there can be only competing rights, i.e., liberty rights
or privileges. Liberty rights are really only rights in a loose sense, in that there is an
absence of an obligation to refrain from doing anything. Locke also acknowledges
something akin to liberty rights, but his gentler picture of the state of nature relegates the
operation of such rights to a “zone of indifference,” argues Simmons, outside of the
governance of the natural law.66 This structure makes room for an additional, more robust
type of right. In accepting natural duties, Locke’s theory can accommodate claim-rights,
protected rights that correspond to the duties of others.67 As a result of their differing
views of human nature and natural freedom, Hobbes and Locke also develop divergent
views of the proper form of government. Both philosophers recognize that unlimited
freedom is dangerous, but they see different solutions to the problem: for Hobbes, a state
with absolute power is the only solution, while Locke prefers to understand human beings
as psychologically capable of limiting their own natural freedom. So, for Locke, human
beings are born with limits and his faith in those natural limits shape his theory of
government just as much as his faith in individual freedom.
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Now, in one sense, this interpretive debate amounts to little more than an
intellectual exercise because each of the above positions trade upon textual ambiguities
and much of the puzzle arises simply because Locke was less rigorous about his use of
rights terminology than we might have liked. So we must carefully guard against reading
back into the text the structure of a more sophisticated contemporary rights theory. We do
well to keep in mind, then, that both Locke and Hobbes are treading on relatively new
territory when they venture into ‘rights talk’ and it is not clear that either one gave much
thought to what exactly he meant by ‘rights’ or worried much at all about making sense
of the complex relationship between rights and duties. To the extent that such thought is
necessary for developing a genuine theory of rights, neither Locke nor Hobbes can be
properly characterized as natural rights theorists.
That being said, one need not have a perfectly worked out rights theory in order to
say something interesting. What is clear is that Locke feared the excesses of both
unrestrained freedom and unrestrained rule and both rights and duties play a role in
striking the appropriate balance. Thus, I align myself with Simmons here insofar as he is
correct that Locke uses rights terminology in several different contexts and not primarily
as either prior to or derivative of natural duties. The approximate view, then, is that
human beings are born with a natural right to freedom, but that freedom would be
meaningless without certain limits; these limits appear in the form of duties to respect the
rights of others and God’s commands.
First, it is fairly easy to show that Locke does not explicitly give rights the status
ascribed to them by Strauss and his followers. Simply going by the numbers, whenever
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Locke discusses morality or the natural law, virtually all of his observations and
instructions concern duties.68 At the least, this would be odd if Locke were relying upon
natural rights as foundational. In fact, he hardly even mentions rights outside of the Two
Treatises and even within the Treatises, textual support for rights being prior to duties is
lacking.69 Indeed, if any decisive relationship between rights and duties can be gleaned
from Locke’s political works, the evidence suggests that they are nearly coextensive.
Though Locke talks about individuals seeking self-preservation in the law of nature, once
one has secured this right for himself, he also has a duty to preserve the rest of mankind.
In fact, Locke actually refers to the right to self-preservation, so central to Strauss’s
reading, as a duty coming directly from the natural law.70 Moreover, in his discussion of
property rights, Locke insists that acquisition of property is limited by one’s duties to
others. There are ample cases in which Locke refers to duties limiting rights, calling into
question the idea that duties exist solely for the sake of securing one’s natural rights.
Still, the Straussian line is not so easily cast aside given that this view relies more
on what Locke does not say and what he fails to prove and less on what he does say and
what he does prove. Strauss maintains that Locke’s natural law theory is inconsistent
because though Locke says that the precepts of the natural law are discoverable by
68
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reason, the validity of his argument relies upon a premise that could only be known by
divine revelation. Locke emphasizes the necessity of divine sanctions backing the natural
law; consequently, his theory requires proof of the afterlife, in which God rewards the
virtuous and punishes the wicked, and human reason cannot provide such proof. Thus,
Locke’s natural law is not a law of reason; it cannot be known in the state of nature and
so it cannot guide the actions of individuals. Fortunately, all is not lost because Locke
does manage to hold a consistent view of the state of nature as one within which
individuals constantly strive to preserve themselves, says Strauss. This natural right can
and does serve as the basis for action in the state of nature. Therefore, Locke’s natural
law theory, despite appearances to the contrary, actually relies upon a Hobbesian right to
self-preservation rather than obedience to an independent moral or divine law.71
There is some truth to what Strauss says. Certainly, it is not completely ridiculous
to think of the Second Treatise as a book about individual rights.72 Also, as I pointed out
previously, Strauss is not the only one to criticize Locke’s natural law theory on the
grounds that it is internally inconsistent and I think, as we will see next, he is correct that
explaining how the content of our natural duties may be demonstrated is a major problem
for Locke. However, I do not think that it helps matters to ignore large portions of text
assuming that Locke was being, at best disingenuous and at worse obtuse, whenever he
says that individuals living in the state of nature have natural duties and must live
71
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according to the natural law. In the following chapter, I suggest a more reasonable way of
making Locke’s natural law theory consistent by searching for a more suitable secular
moral law that can be discovered even while living within the state of nature (i.e., Kant’s
moral law).
The above doubts raised about interpreting Locke as a natural rights theorist lead
others to suggest that perhaps it is duties rather than rights that take priority. There is
more textual evidence to support this second view making it more difficult to argue
against than the Straussian position, but, in the end, viewing Locke as a natural law
theorist of a Thomistic stripe is nearly as problematic. Recall that Suarez, operating
within a Thomistic framework, asserts that rights stem from the natural law and that there
can be no rights besides those that are necessary for the fulfillment of God’s commands.
While Locke discusses rights, such as parental rights, which stem from the duties that one
has in relation to the natural law, he does not view all rights as subordinate to the natural
law. Simmons describes the different contexts within which Locke discusses rights and
their complex relationship to duties. He begins by pointing to four kinds of rights in the
Treatises: (1) liberty rights, (2) moral powers, (3) optional claim rights, and (4)
mandatory claim rights.73 The mistaken interpretation of Locke that sees him as deriving
rights from natural duties comes from conflating the third and fourth types of rights.
Mandatory rights are those that are held “as a direct consequence of duties that the
rightholder has.”74 Basically, the idea here is that if I have a duty to do something, then I
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must have a right to do it and this correlates with others’ duties to allow me to do my
duty. Locke’s commitment to mandatory rights can be seen most clearly in the way he
derives parental rights from the parents’ duty to care for their children or to “preserve
what they have begotten.”75 Optional rights, on the other hand, are rights, whose exercise
are protected by duties of noninterference, but are still optional for the rights-holder. For
example, I have the optional right to grow apples or peaches on my land. Should I decide
to grow apples, others are bound to allow me to exercise my right to do so. Interpreters,
such as Dunn, Tully, and Ashcraft, who see moral duties as foundational and rights as
secondary, hold either that all rights are mandatory claim rights, i.e., rights are simply a
means to the fulfillment of our duties, or that rights are derivative of the natural law
because natural duties always limit the extent of our optional rights.76
As Simmons argues, neither of the above reasons for understanding natural duties
as prior to natural rights stands up to scrutiny. Mandatory claim rights are only one type
of right on Locke’s theory and he allows plenty of space within which one has a right, in
spite of not having a duty, to perform actions according to one’s own discretion.
Simmons calls this a “robust zone of indifference,” a zone of protected liberty within
which others have duties to allow me to exercise my right.77 If such optional rights are
correlates of others’ duties rather than consequences of my own duties, then there seems
to be no reason to think that duties are prior to rights. Also, even though it is true that
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Locke thinks that rights are always limited by the natural law, it does not follow that
rights have a secondary status. The precepts of the law of nature define both duties and
rights (e.g., the right to private property is part of the natural law, for Locke). We have
both restrictive duties and protective rights as granted by Locke’s natural law. In other
words, natural duties on Locke’s theory serve to protect my basic freedoms from the
encroachment of others as much as they seek to limit my encroachment upon the
freedoms of others.
In this section, I have examined the reasons for thinking that Locke is either a
natural rights theorist or a natural law theorist. I think it is quite clear that we ought to
reject both views as they stand and I agree with Simmons that the most accurate
representation of Locke’s considered thoughts regarding the relationship between rights
and duties lies somewhere in the middle.

V. Conclusion
Although the influence of Locke’s natural law predecessors is evident in much of
his work, he uses elements of many different theories to create a unique view of his own.
Unfortunately, it is tough to see how such a piecemeal theory could manage to be
consistent and it remains to be seen whether a successful Lockeian theory of moral
obligation is available. Locke’s natural law theory revolves around two main questions:
(a) an epistemological one, how human beings come to know the moral law and (b) a
normative one, what gives this law its binding force. Locke fails to answer both questions
well. He argues that human beings come to know the moral law through the operation of
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reason upon sensory data. Though Locke never shows how it is that the content of moral
laws can be deduced from sensory data, he also never gives up on the idea that the laws
of nature can be demonstrated in this way. As for the moral question, Locke’s answer is
equally ambiguous. He maintains, along with Aquinas, a voluntaristic view that God is
the ultimate source of moral obligation, but also, with Grotius and Pufendorf, he holds
that human reason operating upon sensory data plays an essential part in justifying the
human obligation to obey God’s commands. So, in the end, Locke’s natural law theory
points toward a complicated view of moral obligation. God commands the moral law, but
because of God’s wisdom and justice, he would never expect human beings to be
obligated to follow his commands unless they were capable of understanding their duties.
This is why human beings have been endowed with the ability to reason about moral laws
and this is why the moral laws must be capable of being known through reason.
In the next chapter, I discuss these ambiguities and complexities in more detail.
From the underdeveloped empiricist natural law theory that the early Locke espouses, but
that the later Locke also seems to continue to endorse despite never offering any real
proof, it is evident that in order to have a comprehensive theory of moral obligation
Locke needs to borrow significantly from more plausible moral theories. I argue that
Kant’s theory of moral obligation can supply a more promising answer to the
epistemological and normative questions raised above.
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Part I, Chapter Three:
Moral Obligation: The Problems of Knowability and Normativity
I. Introduction
In Locke’s earliest attempt to sketch a theory of moral obligation, the Essays on
the Law of Nature, he searches for the source of the moral law, the source of our
knowledge of moral duties, and the source and nature of the moral authority attached to
them. Additionally, later works, such as the Essay Concerning Human Understanding,78
contain references to the earlier work and are peppered with attempts to build upon and
fill in the details of his early moral theory. Even some of Locke’s most widely known
arguments in his political writings, including the Two Treatises of Government,79 assume
the truth of his natural law theory.80 So it would seem that Locke needs a comprehensive
theory of moral obligation if his system is to be internally consistent.
As I understand it, however, there are two barriers to Locke’s natural law theory
being a credible theory of moral obligation. He fails to answer two significant questions
satisfactorily: (1) how can human beings know their moral obligations? And (2) what
makes the natural law morally binding? The first, is a puzzle about knowing the content
of the moral law: if Locke’s moral theory is to agree with his empiricist epistemology, he
must show that the content of the moral law can be discovered by the operation of human
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reasoning upon ideas gleaned from sense experience and cognitive reflection alone.
Though Locke insists that it is possible to deduce the natural law from sensation and
reflection, he never successfully carries out such a demonstration;81 and without a
specific example to evaluate it is difficult to imagine how Locke’s conception of knowing
moral obligations could avoid running afoul of the naturalistic fallacy. Initially, at least,
the prospects look bleak for deriving normative rules governing human behavior from
physical facts we observe in nature.
The second question that gives Locke trouble is a puzzle about the source of
moral obligation: even if Locke could successfully show that we derive our moral
obligations from sensation and reflection, he still would need to explain what gives these
rules moral authority. What distinguishes moral obligations from, for example, familial
obligations, which we also might derive from empirical data? As I mention in passing in
the previous chapter, in some passages, Locke seems to defend a moral voluntarist
position according to which the authority of the law comes from the legitimacy of the
legislator.82 In the case of the natural moral law, then, the legislator is the divine creator,
who is perfectly legitimate giving the natural law perfect moral authority. So according to
this divine command theory, the moral law, being God’s command, is binding upon us
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because it is an expression of God’s perfect will.83 However, if being commanded by God
is sufficient to make the natural law morally binding, Locke’s commitment to empiricist
epistemology puts him in a difficult position once again. In this case, Locke’s naturalist
empiricism would demand not only that human beings be able to discover the content of
their moral obligations using only empirical evidence, but also that they be able to
determine that the putative moral obligations they discover are indeed God’s commands
and that they are morally binding because of that fact. Making these determinations,
though, would require empirically verifying several other claims, i.e., that God exists,
that he is a perfectly legitimate legislator, that he has a perfectly good will, that human
beings are not being deceived in some way, etc. Finding empirical evidence for all of this
seems unlikely.84
In other passages though, Locke seems to defend a moral realist position, i.e., that
there are moral facts in the world that constitute the natural law and knowing these moral
facts along with certain facts about human nature makes the natural law binding upon
us,85 but while it is clear that Locke thinks having access to the content of a law is a
necessary condition for being bound to obey that law, he does not think it is sufficient.
Locke seems to hold a twofold view of the source of normativity: God’s will gives the
natural law external moral authority, while certain facts about human nature give the
natural law internal moral authority. Still, successfully verifying the legitimacy of the
83
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sources of moral obligation using empirical data appears even less likely than being able
to derive specific moral obligations from empirical observations.
Thus, as it stands, Locke’s natural law theory lacks crucial elements of a theory of
moral obligation and it seems doubtful that those crucial elements could be hidden
somewhere within his corpus. Locke’s treatment of the natural law and how it might line
up with his naturalist empiricism simply lacks the appropriate level of detail. On this
point virtually everyone who has looked into the subject agrees.86 However, disagreement
abounds regarding the broader implications of such a conclusion. Some, drawing
attention to Locke’s decision not to publish his eight essays on the law of nature and what
they interpret as his later hedonistic theory of moral motivation, choose to ignore
references to the natural law in his later published works or to dismiss such references as
residual claims left over from Locke’s misguided youth, which he was never able to
substantiate, but which he ultimately found to have little bearing upon his most important
arguments anyway.87 Others point to Locke’s final work, the Reasonableness of
Christianity,88 as evidence that, in the end, although he wished to disavow entirely his
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early natural law theory because he recognized that he was unable to make it consistent
with his empiricist epistemology, he also realized that he needed to replace the failed
moral theory with one that he found to be more palatable.89 Of course, both suggestions
about Locke’s reasons for effectively abandoning his early natural law theory are merely
speculative, since he leaves no explanation for his failure to deliver on his promissory
note.90 Nonetheless, there are independent reasons for thinking that Locke should not
simply discard his early natural law theory; he needs a convincing theory of moral
obligation and, preferably, a convincing natural law theory.
In this chapter, I argue that though we have seen that Locke’s natural law theory,
in its present form, is too vague to count as a decisive theory of moral obligation, certain
of Locke’s central arguments, including the development of a reasonable theory of
political obligation, require that he have some coherent theory of moral obligation. I
maintain such a theory of moral obligation is available—one that adequately responds to
the two questions I raise above and fits within Locke’s metaphysical and epistemological
framework. Moreover, this theory is also identifiable as a natural law theory, though it is
not precisely the same type of natural law theory that the early Locke envisions. This
complex moral theory has a surprising source: Kantian ethics. Incorporating a broadly
Kantian analysis of the Formula of Humanity would provide Locke with an example of a
deduction from observation and reflection to a normative principle, i.e., a duty to respect
humanity. Also, though I think Kant and Locke are similarly imprecise about the source
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of moral authority, I find Christine Korsgaard’s reconstruction of Kant’s conception of
normativity both compelling in its own right91 and not too far removed from Locke’s
naturalist empiricism. Thus, by using certain features of Kant’s moral theory to enrich
Locke’s skeletal theory of natural law, I aim to provide Locke with a coherent and
internally consistent theory of moral obligation.
I organize the chapter as follows. In sections II and III, I explain the problems
with the answers that Locke provides to the two fundamental questions concerning moral
obligation. First, Locke asserts that we can deduce the natural law from sense experience,
but without further details about how such a deduction might work, the naturalistic
fallacy threatens to invalidate his assertion. Second, Locke is unclear about what justifies
the claims that morality makes on us and whatever answer he gives requires empirical
evidence that is not forthcoming. In the fourth section, I give my analysis of Kant’s
Formula of Humanity and a Kantian solution to the problem of normativity in order to
respond to the two crucial questions and I show that, were Locke to adopt these
responses, he would have the tools at his disposal for developing a plausible natural law
theory of moral obligation. Finally, in the last section, I explore the broader implications
for such a complete theory of moral obligation and the work it would do for Locke in his
political arguments.
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II. Locke’s Failed Moral Theory (Part A)
As I note in the previous chapter, what is known as Locke’s natural law theory
has been pieced together from a variety of sources. Although Locke mentions the law of
nature in several places, he presents his most detailed thoughts about the natural law
primarily in the Essays and in the second and fourth books of ECHU. In these two works,
Locke attempts to explain how human beings know their moral obligations and what
gives these principles moral authority. In this section, I explain the problems with
Locke’s claim that the natural law can be deduced from sense experience in the same way
that one might demonstrate a mathematical proof, e.g., a proof in Euclidean geometry.92
First, because of Locke’s commitment to naturalist empiricism, which he defends
in the first book of ECHU, Locke rejects the rationalist foundation upon which other
natural law theories, both previous to and contemporary with his own, had been built and
proposes an empirically based theory as an alternative.93 Thus, the law of nature, which is
discovered through sense experience, replaces the rationalist concept of innate moral
principles as the guide for human behavior. Arguing primarily against Cambridge
Platonists, such as Henry More,94 Locke says that if moral principles are innate, they
must be universally known. However, it seems that moral principles are not universally
known because some individuals clearly demonstrate a better grasp of moral principles
92
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than others. Therefore, moral principles must not be innate.95 According to Locke, the
moral law is objective, i.e., exists independent of the human mind, and, consequently, is
universally binding, even though it is not universally known; so, he thinks we need an
alternative to the rationalist explanation for how human beings know moral principles
that also accounts for the inequality in knowledge. The explanation says Locke, is that
some faculty or faculties within the agent’s control must be responsible for discovering
moral obligations and this faculty is the reasoning capacity.96
Locke describes the process this way: we observe certain regularities in nature,
e.g., the changing of the seasons, the process of germination and growth of plants, etc.,
and we infer that human beings also must be governed by certain fixed laws.97 Further,
because, like Aristotle, Locke presupposes that the essence of human nature is rationality
and that the supreme exercise of rationality is virtue, he reasons that these fixed laws,
governing creatures with a specifically rational nature, must include not only physical
laws, but also moral laws.98 Hence, in the second of his Essays, he argues that the
objective moral law is derived from certain precepts observed through sense experience.99
However, it is the responsibility of the individual to strive to discover these moral laws
by exercising her reasoning capacity to the maximum extent and it is the failure to do so
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that explains how some know the natural moral law, while others do not. Says Locke, “if
man makes use properly of his reason and of the inborn faculties with which nature has
equipped him, he can attain to the knowledge of this law [the natural law] without any
teacher instructing him in his duties, any monitor reminding him of them.”100 Therefore,
despite the disparity in the individual capacity for reason, the moral law is universally
discoverable by all reasonable people at all times, because it is an objective principle and
so always accessible to those with even the slightest capacity for reason. In short, the law
of nature determines what is virtuous and valuable and it is discoverable through a
process of turning the light of human reason upon precepts revealed by the senses.
At first, Locke’s narrative about how human beings know the moral law seems
promising. It stays true to his empiricist epistemology; it explains, better than the
rationalist picture, the disparity of moral knowledge among individuals; and it responds
better to the moral skeptic since it promises to begin from the most neutral and accessible
ground possible, i.e., sensory data. However, when we further examine and put this idea
to the test, it begins to look less convincing. Notice that the above description of the
process through which human beings discover the moral law says nothing specific about
the content of this law. Also, the few details that Locke provides about what exactly he
means when he says that the moral law is discoverable and demonstrable from sense
experience do not survive criticism. Not only does he fail to illustrate how a
demonstration of an actual moral principle from actual sense data might be possible, the
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only way that I could see his method of conceptual analysis ever succeeding in producing
the proper sort of demonstration would be an obvious violation of the naturalistic fallacy.
To see what I mean, let us look more closely at what Locke does say about the
demonstration of the moral law. In the seventh of his Essays, Locke claims that so long as
man makes proper use of his mental capacities he will attain knowledge, including
knowledge of mathematical and moral truths. In the case of mathematics, the basis for
reasoning is the nature and properties of figures and numbers; in the case of morality,
reasoning begins from the idea of man as a rational being. Locke says:
Since man has been made such as he is, equipped with reason and his
other faculties and destined for this mode of life, there necessarily result
from his inborn constitution some definite duties for him, which cannot be
other than they are. In fact it seems to me to follow just as necessarily
from the nature of man that, if he is a man, he is bound to love and
worship God and also to fulfil [sic] other things appropriate to the rational
nature, i.e., to observe the law of nature, as it follows from the nature of a
triangle that, if it is a triangle, its three angles are equal to two right
angles.101
Here Locke draws a parallel between mathematical and moral knowledge: just as we
might demonstrate from the concept ‘triangle’, as a figure having three sides and three
angles, the sum of which is 180°, and from the concept ‘right angle’, as being equal to
90°, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, so might we
demonstrate from the concept ‘man’, as a rational creature, that he has particular duties,
i.e., to love and worship God, to be just, to respect the property of others, not to murder,
to live harmoniously with others in civil society, etc. Natural moral duties, then, follow
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by necessity, though perhaps not by logical necessity, from the correct definition of
‘human being’.102
There is, however, a serious problem with Locke’s idea of moral demonstration
being analogous to mathematical demonstration. Unlike definitions of mathematical
concepts, such as ‘triangle’ or ‘right angle’, there is considerable disagreement regarding
definitions of moral terms and because Locke adopts Aristotle’s thought that the defining
characteristic of a human being is the ability to reason, he must also accept the
teleological machinery that comes along with the view. The problem is that that
teleological machinery presupposes a particular definition of the good, which is highly
controversial. According to Aristotle, the final good for human beings is happiness, or
living well and living well includes acting virtuously, i.e., acting in accordance with
one’s moral duties. So far there is not much to disagree with, but what is controversial is
that Aristotle also thinks that the ability to reason is man’s natural function and, therefore,
one cannot achieve happiness or live well without exercising his reasoning capacity to the
highest degree, but Aristotle does not fully explain the link between reason and virtue.
So, if Locke wishes to convince us that the content of our moral duties can be derived
from the proper definition of ‘human being’, as ‘rational creature’ in the Aristotelian
sense, he must provide the missing link between rationality and virtue.
One possibility is that Locke means to say that acting rationally just is evidence
that one is acting virtuously, i.e., in accordance with one’s natural moral duties. However,
if Locke’s argument is that the idea of ‘rational human nature’ somehow contains or
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entails the content of our moral duties, then pointing to instances of acting in accordance
with one’s natural moral duties as evidence of rationality makes his definition circular. In
order to avoid circularity and to remain consistent with his empiricism, Locke must show
that ‘rational creature’ is the proper definition of ‘human being’ based upon independent
empirical evidence. In other words, before Locke can even begin to think about deriving
specific moral duties from the definition of ‘human being’, he must convince us, and the
moral skeptic, that his definition is the correct one and he must do so using the most
morally neutral and accessible ground possible, i.e., sensory data.
Now, the only external access to human nature available to us through empirical
means is our observation of the behavior of others and ourselves. However, I doubt that
observation of human behavior yields anything like scientific proof that human beings are
essentially rational creatures with natural moral duties. At most, such observation reveals
only general patterns of ‘reasonable’ behavior, for example, human beings tend to
cooperate with others for their mutual benefit and most recognize cheating as a violation
of some basic norm of fairness. But raw sense data simply cannot relate such ‘reasonable’
behavior to recognition of and obedience to the moral law in any meaningful way as
Locke would need to prove that his definition of ‘human being’ as ‘rational creature’ is
correct. In fact, recent findings of moral psychologists suggest that the empirical evidence
actually disproves the very connection between rationality and virtue that Locke,
Aristotle, and others had presumed.103 Of course, Hobbes predicted this result during
Locke’s time arguing that observation of human behavior, far from indicating a
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predisposition to follow the moral law, actually suggests human beings are essentially
self-interested,104 which Hobbes thinks explains the reasonableness of exiting the state of
nature.105 Thus, it is difficult to see how one could prove, using empirical evidence alone,
that human beings are essentially rational, where rationality relates to following the moral
law. Therefore, if we reject Locke’s definition of ‘rational human nature’, then we must
also reject his conclusion that the content of our moral duties can be derived from his
definition.106
In addition to presupposing obedience to the natural moral law as necessary for
his definition of ‘rational human being’, Locke’s description of moral demonstration falls
short in another important respect. Suppose, for instance, I wish to know whether the
104
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proposition “murder is wrong” is true. How might I analyze this claim according to
Locke’s theory of moral demonstration? First, according to the metaphysical and
epistemological framework that Locke develops in ECHU, all propositions or claims,
including moral propositions, contain simple and complex ideas. On the one hand, simple
ideas are concepts that we passively receive through sensation and reflection;107 on the
other hand, the mind actively constructs complex ideas from the simple ideas it
receives.108 Locke thinks individual moral concepts, such as ‘theft’, ‘lying’, ‘murder’,
‘dueling’, and ‘stealing’ are among the class of complex ideas and can be analyzed and
broken down into their component parts, i.e., simple ideas and relations among simple
ideas.109 So, in order to determine whether the claim “murder is wrong” is true, we must
break down the complex idea ‘murder’ into its simple ideas and then compare that set of
simple ideas to the set of simple ideas composing the relevant moral law in something
like the following way:
First, from reflection on the operations of our own minds, we have the
ideas of willing, considering, purposing beforehand, malice, or wishing ill
to another; and also of life, or perception, and self-motion. Secondly, from
sensation we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are
to be found in a man, and of some action, whereby we put an end to
perception and motion in the man; all of which simple ideas are
comprehended in the word murder…if I have the will of a supreme
invisible Lawgiver for my rule, then, as I supposed the action commanded
or forbidden by God, I call it good or evil, sin or duty…their [the moral
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terms’] rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement
with those patterns prescribed by some law.110
If the pattern of simple ideas making up the action I identify as murder matches the
pattern of the simple ideas composing the moral law (the moral law being something like:
human beings ought not engage in the wrongful death of one by another), then the
proposition “murder is wrong or vicious” is true.
By now the second problem with Locke’s explanation of moral demonstration
should be becoming clearer. If conceptual analysis of moral terms, such as, ‘murder’
yield simple ideas that are purely descriptive, then although Locke succeeds in staying
true to his empiricist epistemology, he does not succeed in deriving moral duties from
sense data. Nowhere in Locke’s own analysis of the term in the first six lines of the
passage quoted above does the idea ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ or any other unequivocally
normative indicator appear.111 So I do not see how a comparison between the simple
ideas contained in a moral concept and the simple ideas contained in the relevant moral
law could provide information about the truth of a moral proposition, which is a
normative statement. As it is, in the above analysis, Locke simply assumes the existence
of God’s law as the moral law and even this he states as a conditional, as only one option
among many rules we might use to judge the truth of a moral proposition. If this is what
Locke means by moral demonstration, namely, a comparison of the analysis of a moral
term with some rule in order to determine whether it agrees or disagrees with the rule,
110
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then he certainly does not show that the moral law can be discovered from morally
neutral precepts received through sensation and reflection.
So, could we demonstrate the natural moral law from the definition of ‘human
being’ as ‘rational creature’ and an analysis of the simple ideas composing complex
moral terms in some other way? In other words, could we determine that we have a moral
duty not to murder by analyzing an act of murder? I think this is possible only if complex
moral terms themselves contain simple ideas of ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘duty’,
etc. or we assume some principle of normativity prior to analysis and somehow read into
the descriptive analysis our predetermined moral duties. We will examine whether the
former possibility is a live option for Locke next in the discussion of moral realism, but,
initially, this seems arbitrary because, even leaving aside the question of whether ideas
like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are simple ones, if our minds actively construct complex ideas
out of simple ideas, as Locke contends, then it seems as if we could toss the simple idea
‘wrong’ into any set of simple ideas in order to create a complex moral term.112
The latter possibility is almost certainly a non-starter because it is a clear violation
of the naturalistic fallacy. Even if I assume that I have a duty not to murder, nothing in
the physical description of an act of murder could clearly distinguish it from the physical
description of, say, killing in self-defense. The problem here is not in using empirical
evidence in order to explain why murder is wrong (this could be accomplished simply by
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referring to murder’s sociological impact upon communities and individuals perhaps), but
in identifying an act of murder in the first place. From an empirical standpoint, the
physical description of acts of justified and unjustified killing are exactly the same.113
Hence, I could not derive a normative conclusion about an act of murder from only the
empirical description of such an act without illicitly deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.
A final possibility that I would like to suggest here is that perhaps by
demonstration, Locke means something analogous to the metaphysical theory of
supervenience or emergence, according to which the concept ‘object’ supervenes upon a
group of related properties arranged in a particular way.114 If Locke were to borrow this
idea, then, he might think that normativity supervenes on or emerges from a particular
arrangement of purely descriptive simple ideas. For example, again taking Locke’s
conceptual analysis of the term ‘murder’: from the ideas of “willing, considering,
purposing beforehand, malice, or wishing ill to another; and…life, or perception, and
self-motion” and from the idea of an action resulting in “an end to perception and motion
in [a] man” existing within two individual bodies in close proximity to each other, under
specified circumstances, might emerge the complex idea of ‘wrongful killing’. The
arrangement certainly would be complicated, perhaps too complicated to conceptualize;
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nonetheless, I think something along these lines may yield a plausible account of moral
demonstration and were we to include simple ideas describing the killer’s state-of-mind
as part of the arrangement, it would be even more promising. But there is no solid
evidence that Locke had anything like this in mind in his discussion of deriving moral
duties from sense data. Thus, we are forced to conclude at this point that, upon closer
review, Locke’s idea that the moral law may be derived from ideas gained through sense
experience does not persuasively respond to the first question about how human beings
might know their moral obligations.

III. Locke’s Failed Moral Theory (Part B)
Now let us examine whether Locke has more success answering the second
question regarding the source of moral authority. The aim here is to explain what justifies
the claims that morality makes upon us. As I have mentioned, Locke scholars debate two
possible answers: either Locke is a voluntarist or he is a moral realist about the source of
bindingness.115 According to the Pufendorfian type of voluntarism (or divine command
theory) that Locke seems to endorse, although the content of the moral law is
independent of God’s will and as a result, non-arbitrary and discoverable by human
115
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reason, it only has the “force of law”it is only obligatorybecause it is legislated by
God, who alone has the power to enforce the moral law.116 By contrast, according to
Grotius’s brand of moral reason, which Locke also appears to accept, we would have
moral duties even if God did not exist and there were no effective sovereign because
obedience to the moral law is obligatory independent of who the legislator is or how the
law comes to be.117 Moral realists deny that the natural world is morally indifferent
claiming instead that there are moral facts in the world that make some actions right and
some actions wrong. Thus, for realists, questions about moral authority reduce to
questions about the moral facts in the world.
Now, it is tempting to read the early Locke in his writings on natural law as
advocating a voluntarism of the sort Pufendorf defends. In one passage in the Essays,
Locke appears to support this view explaining the following scenario: “at God’s
command the binding force of this law [the natural law] can lapse, for this actually
happened, as we read, in the case of the Israelites when they departed from Egypt and
journeyed to Palestine.”118 Here, Locke describes a time when God seems to suspend the
Israelites’ natural moral obligation to respect the property rights of the Egyptians. So it
looks as if the bindingness of the natural law is contingent upon God’s will and that God
has the authority to change it. However, Locke goes on to point out that, actually, it is not
the law or God’s will that has changed in this case. Rather, he says, because the
circumstances have changed, it is the case that the natural law no longer applies in the
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same way. In other words, were God ever to suspend or change the natural law on a
whim and without good cause, then the law would be arbitrary. But because God can
expect human beings neither to obey a law that they cannot predict nor to obey a divine
legislator whose commands appear to them to be arbitrary and irrational, there must be a
discernable reason that the Israelites were free to acquire the property of the Egyptians in
this particular case.119 This argument, admittedly, has problems, but what is important for
the point at hand is that, like Pufendorf, Locke expressly avoids the strong voluntarist
position, advocated by some moralists, for instance, during the Reformation that God
could, at any time, change or suspend the natural law at his whim. Though Locke
certainly thinks that the natural law expresses God’s will and is at least externally binding
for this reason, unlike Pufendorf, he also thinks that the commands of the natural law
derive their binding force, at least in part, from their discoverability.120 So, though he
clearly thinks God’s will plays an important role in making the natural law authoritative,
God’s legislative power is not in itself the entire explanation.
The second possible interpretation of Locke’s justification for the natural law
being morally binding is moral realism. There is at least one independent reason to
interpret Locke as a realist. As I examined at some length above, Locke’s early natural
law theory depends upon his claim that human beings are capable of discovering the
119
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natural law through sense experience and observation alone; and it seems to me that one
way to make sense of the idea that moral obligations are demonstrable from empirical
evidence is to read Locke as a moral realist. If this is right, Locke thinks that sense
experience provides more than merely physical facts about the world; it also provides us
with certain moral facts, which our reasoning faculty then uses to derive the moral law. I
think that Locke may have such a view in mind in ECHU when he adds reflection to the
list of faculties that help us to perceive our world. Looking back at the passage where
Locke performs the conceptual analysis on the moral concept ‘murder’, we see that
reflection provides us with certain simple ideas that emit at least a tinge of normativity,
e.g., malice, or wishing ill to another, while sensation provides purely descriptive ones.
Thus, it is not much of a leap to think that, through reflection, we receive simple ideas
that are moral facts about the world showing that Locke tends toward a realist perspective
regarding moral authority. In addition, Locke directly refers to reason’s recognition of the
moral law as the source of moral authority in an earlier passage, which ties obligation to
the will:
All obligation binds conscience and lays a bond on the mind itself, so that
not fear of punishment, but a rational apprehension of what is right, puts
us under an obligation, and conscience passes judgment on morals, and, if
we are guilty of a crime, declares that we deserve punishment. 121
This passage is similar to Grotius’s definition of the natural law as a decree of the
judgment made by right reason and consequently decreed by God.122 Thus, it is also
plausible to read Locke as agreeing with Grotius in thinking that moral authority just is
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the comprehension of the moral law and the recognition of one’s specific moral duties
that binds the conscience.
Unfortunately, unless we decide this interpretive debate purely on the basis of the
number of passages in support of each interpretation, looking at individual passages out
of context will not help to settle the dispute about whether Locke is a voluntarist or a
realist. He is simply unclear regarding the source of moral authority, making statements
in support of both horns of this up-dated version of Euthyphro’s dilemma. What is clear
is that Locke wishes to avoid the extremes of each position. He fears both the
arbitrariness, or at least inconspicuousness, of an ethical voluntarism that says the moral
law has authority because it is God’s command and conversely, the lack of strong moral
authority of a moral realism divorced from some definite standard or judge of morality.
Hence, I think that Locke’s actual position may lie somewhere in the middle. But
whatever interpretation of Locke’s account of the source of moral authority one settles
upon, Locke will need to deal with worries about consistency because his empiricism
causes trouble for each.
First, I have already touched upon the problems with thinking that voluntarism
and empiricism could be compatible. At the least, such a project would require an a
posteriori proof of God’s existence. While Locke does assume the truth of such an
empirical proof (which takes the vague form of a design argument) one gets the distinct
impression that this is merely an after-thought, not intended as support for a particular
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argument.123 Either Locke fails to recognize or he ignores the difficulty his empiricism
causes for him when he claims that we are bound to obey the natural moral law because it
is God’s decree.
Second, although I think moral realism is compatible with Locke’s naturalist
empiricism, the difficulty with this interpretation is that moral realism itself offers a
rather weak justification for the claims morality makes upon us. It seems that without an
unambiguous measure or judge of the moral law, even if we could know that we have
truly discovered a moral fact, it is at least arguable whether the mere recognition of one’s
obligation gives that obligation moral authority. In the following section, I look at Kant’s
defense of this type of moral internalism based upon an objective view of human nature.
As I have already discussed, this seems to be a move that Locke attempts as well, but
because he fails to develop a non-contentious definition of ‘rational human nature’, his
view cannot serve as a credible basis for moral realism. We will see whether Kant has a
more credible definition of human nature and whether it can serve as the basis for a
plausible theory of moral authority in the next section.
In this section, I have shown that Locke’s natural law theory fails to respond to
the two crucial questions around which any complete theory of moral obligation must be
built: (1) how do we know our natural moral obligations? And (2) what gives these
obligations moral authority? To the first, he answers that we can demonstrate the moral
law from sense experience. This response has two problems. First, he argues that we can
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derive our natural moral duties from the proper definition of ‘human being’ as ‘rational
creature’, but his definition of ‘rational human nature’ is circular. Second, if conceptual
analysis of complex moral ideas, such as ‘murder’, yields a purely descriptive set of
simple ideas, then Locke cannot derive natural moral duties from moral propositions
without committing the naturalistic fallacy. To the second question, Locke responds that
the moral law is binding either because it is a manifestation of God’s will or because it is
intrinsically binding for rational creatures who discover it. Both of these potential
responses to the problem of normativity fail, however, when we try to understand how
they might work with Locke’s naturalist empiricism. Therefore, Locke does not have a
convincing account of moral obligation and my task in the next section is to prove that
were Locke to adopt a broadly Kantian theory of moral obligation, he would be able to
answer these two crucial questions.

IV. A Kantian Solution
In this section, I introduce a Kantian analysis of the Formula of Humanity that
explains how we come to know our moral obligations and I discuss the merits of
Korsgaard’s solution to the question about moral authority or what justifies the claims
that morality makes upon us, which she calls “reflective endorsement.” In so doing, I
begin to shape a comprehensive theory of moral obligation that answers the two crucial
questions that we have been focusing upon throughout this chapter and, which Locke
could use to correct and further develop his own moral theory. But, before turning to the
Kantian solution, to ensure that, in the end, the compromise moral theory we have
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remains, at its core, Lockeian, i.e., one that Locke could endorse without giving up the
key features of his own underdeveloped moral theory specified in chapter two, we must
first identify key features of natural law theories in general.
As I see it, there are three minimum qualifications for classifying a theory of
moral obligation as a natural law theory, in the broadest terms. First, a moral theory that
is a natural law theory must be committed to a basic version of moral realism, i.e., the
idea that some moral propositions are literally true because they correspond to facts in the
world. Second, all natural law theories recognize an important or deep connection
between human nature (however it is defined) and the natural moral law. This connection
is important for the human capacity to know and to be bound by the natural law. Third,
the natural law must be linked to practical reason; in other words, the natural law must be
a sufficient guide to human behavior.
By now it should be clear that Locke’s moral theory, rough as it is, more than
meets these basic requirements for being a natural law theory. Though Locke talks a fair
amount about God’s authority with regard to the natural law, it is not God’s authority (or,
at any rate, it is not only God’s authority) that gives the law its force; Locke is committed
to moral realism thinking that the natural moral law may be derived from certain facts
about human nature and the natural world.124 And while the natural law certainly could
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never conflict with God’s will, the law of nature is morally binding and a proper guide to
human behavior precisely because it is founded upon an unchanging human nature, in
conformity with human rationality, and discoverable by human reason. It should also be
clear that Locke’s commitment to naturalist empiricism clashes with aspects of all three
qualifications above. So I argue that saving Locke’s natural law theory of moral
obligation necessitates relaxing that allegiance and embracing more of a rationalist point
of view.
Keeping all of this in mind, then, let us now examine Kant’s moral theory. Recall
that Locke says that the moral law is universally discoverable by and accessible to all
reasonable people at all times, it is an objective law, and that the rational nature of human
beings determines their particular duties. Kant says something similar about what he calls
the “supreme practical principle” of morality for human beings: if such a principle exists,
it must be “an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, [constituting] an objective
principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law.”125 According to
Kant, this universal practical imperative, known as the Formula of Humanity, is the
following: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”126
Now I think it is possible to read Kant’s justification for this second formulation
of the moral law as an example of a moral demonstration. But, unlike Locke, who insists
upon deriving the content of the natural moral law from empirical evidence alone, Kant
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offers an a priori demonstration of the content of the supreme practical imperative. He
begins from a subjective conception of the imperative and moves toward an objective
one. Kant says that human beings necessarily understand their own existence with
reference to a basic assumption of the practical imperative: “rational nature exists as an
end in itself;” in other words, each individual is compelled by her nature as a rational
being to think of herself as being an end, i.e., having intrinsic value.127 This realization is
what Korsgaard calls having a “moral identity.”128 Moreover, as a result of this
realization attained through a process of self-reflection, one has certain expectations
about the way she ought to be treated. Indeed, it is this deep understanding of oneself as
having moral worth from which all other laws of practical reasoning governing the will
are derived.129 However, the demonstration of the moral law happens in the move from a
purely subjective proposition, ‘I am a rational being existing as an end in myself and
others should so act that they use my humanity always as an end and never merely as a
means’, to the objective, universal practical imperative, which applies to all creatures
with a rational nature. This is where Locke could most benefit from Kant’s wisdom. So
what might a Kantian demonstration from the realization that ‘I am a being worthy of
moral respect, who should be treated as such’ to the universal obligation that ‘I should
treat all rational beings as worthy of respect’ look like?
First, this move from the subjective to the objective requires that I recognize
myself not merely as a rational being, but as one among many members of a society of
127
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rational beings. Focusing upon our shared humanity shows that the Formula of Humanity
is about respecting humanity in general, not just respecting any particular instantiation of
humanity. Once I recognize, through a process of reflecting upon my own human nature,
that because I am a rational being, I have intrinsic value and others owe me a duty of
respect, I also recognize that those who owe me respect could not be bound by such a
duty without themselves being rational.130 Hence, if I truly believe that such a duty exists
for others with respect to myself, then, in order to avoid contradiction, I must also believe
that this duty applies to all rational beings, including myself, and in this way I have
derived the objective, universal practical imperative: always treat oneself and others as an
end, and never merely as a means.
Now my straightforward description of Kant’s view above is based upon a
rationalist doctrine131 and although Locke rejects the rationalist idea that the natural
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moral law is composed of innate moral principles, I think Locke actually accepts Kant’s
rationalism. For, in denying the possibility of innate moral principles, Locke does not
deny the possibility of a priori knowledge; rather, what he finds objectionable about the
earlier rationalist natural law theories is that their claims about how human beings know
the moral law are inconsistent with our empirical observations of human behavior. If the
moral law were, in truth, ‘written on the hearts of men’, then everyone would agree about
its content and different cultures around the world would acknowledge the same basic
moral principles. But this is not the case. By contrast, Locke seems explicitly to agree
with Kant that the moral law can be demonstrated from the proper definition of ‘rational
human nature’; for example, Locke says that the law of nature is tied to the very essence
of man. He says that man’s moral duties “necessarily follow from his very
nature…natural law stands and falls together with the nature of man as it is at present”132
and this is a rationalist view.
However, Locke also asserts that we could find empirical evidence to substantiate
the claim that human beings are essentially rational creatures who recognize that they
have natural moral obligations, an assertion, which I rejected in section II of this chapter.
Kant also agrees that there are limits to such an empiricist approach to the nature of
morality. He argues that evidence from sense experience can neither prove that human
beings are rational and autonomous, nor fully demonstrate the grounds for our moral
duties; these ideas must be known a priori,133 hence, my rationalist interpretation of
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Kant’s moral demonstration above. But while I think that rationalism provides a solid
foundation for understanding human nature and demonstrating general moral obligations,
or what Kant calls imperfect duties, I do not think we can rely upon rationalism to
provide us with knowledge of the content of specific moral obligations, or what Kant
calls perfect duties.134
Sense experience and observation reinforce a priori principles and provide facts
about the world that are necessary for knowing our specific moral obligations and making
the moral law a practical guide for human behavior. Although I can reason out the
general moral obligation that I ought to respect humanity, knowing what that duty of
respect entails in particular situations requires knowing some empirical data. For
instance, given the correct definition of the term ‘murder’ I may be able to deduce a
priori that murder is wrong from the Formula of Humanity. But in order to condemn a
particular act of murder as a violation of the duty to respect humanity, I need to know
some empirical information to help me identify the act as murder in the first place, e.g.,
physical facts gained through sensation and reflection (similar to those Locke offers in
his description, which I cite in section II above); facts about human psychology and the
psychology of the individual parties involved; and perhaps facts about the impact such an
act would have upon society and its members. From all of this I would know that acting
upon my desire to shoot Sally would be a violation of my duty to respect humanity. So,
were Locke to accept a rationalist starting point for his demonstration of the natural moral
134
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law: the a priori definition of human being, as ‘rational creature’, and, following from
that, my Kantian justification for the Formula of Humanity, he could then incorporate
empirical data in order to derive specific moral laws. But without this rationalist
foundation, I fail to see how Locke might demonstrate the moral law from empiricist
precepts alone.
Thus far, I have established that Kant’s rationalist foundation for the moral law
could help Locke to show that human beings come to know their moral obligations
through a series of a priori and a posteriori demonstrations combining a rationalist
definition of ‘rational human nature’ with empirical facts in order to derive specific moral
obligations. In this final part of this section, I discuss Korsgaard’s solution to the problem
of normativity because I think it is a credible theory of moral authority and I show that
although Locke and Kant (via Korsgaard) fundamentally disagree about what justifies the
demands that morality makes upon us, both think that normativity itself is part of the
fabric of observation and reflection for rational beings. In other words, though Kant and
Locke take the objects of observation and reflection to be different—for Kant, reason
creates normativity by reflecting upon its fundamental rational nature and willing the
moral law, while for Locke, one discovers the natural moral law by observing and
reflecting upon objective facts about the world gained through sense experience as a
rational being135—they agree that human beings cannot be obligated to obey the moral
law unless they have the ability to recognize its commands as binding upon them and
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they agree that that ability to recognize the moral law as authoritative, in turn, depends
upon certain facts about human nature.
Kant is most often interpreted as a constructivist on the question of what gives the
law moral authority.136 According to this view, the claims that morality makes are
binding upon us because, as rational creatures, we recognize a certain type of authority in
ourselves (i.e., because I see myself as capable of self-conscious reflection concerning
my own actions, I have the capacity to act autonomously, which gives me a kind of
authority over myself) and the claims of morality are ones that I would will for myself.137
So, I recognize the commands of the moral law as binding upon me and other rational
beings because normativity comes from my own free will.
Korsgaard, filling in some of the details of the above viewpoint, offers a slightly
modified version of Kantian constructivism. She calls her view “reflective endorsement.”
The main feature of Korsgaard’s view is that the source of moral obligation is reason’s
reflective endorsement of our desires; moral duties come from the will’s judgment of
each desire according to a law that “arises from the nature of the will.”138 She argues that,
according to Kant, an autonomous moral agent deliberates about his actions by testing
each of his desires or impulses to determine whether it is a reason to act. A desire or
impulse is a reason to act if it stems from one’s consistent or genuine will and it is the
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sort of thing one could make public or will as a universal law. The difference between
this and the more typical constructivist position is that the “reasons sought here are
practical reasons; the idea is to show that morality is good for us.”139 So, reflective
endorsement is the test used to “establish the normativity of all [our] particular motives
and inclinations” and to guide our actions in such a way as to give full expression to our
very humanity.140
Now I think that Locke could make use of Korsgaard’s reflective endorsement
view of moral authority in order to bolster his appeal to moral realism and his ability to
solve the problem of normativity. What justifies morality’s claims upon us is that we are
rational beings capable of evaluating our actions from an objective standard of the right
or the good and as such, our judgments have a particular authority that the judgments of
non-rational beings do not have. But for Locke, contra Korsgaard, that objective standard
of the right or the good is independent of our rational nature. The light of reason or
common sense is capable of discovering this independent standard, but Locke insists that
our reasoning capacity in no way imposes a moral standard upon the world. Here Kant
would object to Locke’s moral realism because if the moral law is external to the will,
then the will is not absolutely free and freedom is the key to autonomy according to
Kant.141 But I do not see how the moral law’s being external to the human will threatens
the autonomy of rational creatures. As rational beings, we are free to accept or to deny
our obligations whether they come from reason reflectively endorsing our desires or from
139
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reason discovering the moral law from facts about the world and facts about human
nature.142 We are not free, however, to avoid the evaluation of our actions from that
objective standpoint. This is something that rational beings do automatically or
intuitively.
The process of observation and reflection is the distinguishing feature of a rational
human nature that makes moral authority possible and because of this, human nature is
such that knowing the law is enough to put one under an obligation. Again, it is this
ability to reflect upon our actions and desires according to what is good for us that is the
expression of our very humanity and, as such, it gives us access to a more complex level
of conception, the moral realm. So, were Locke to adopt such a view, he would say that it
is not just the ability to judge our actions against a moral law, but also the ability to judge
our actions against a moral law, obedience to which has been empirically proven to be
what is best for us in the end, that constitutes the source of normativity.
In addition, the natural law is not merely consistent with human nature; rather, by
obeying the natural law, human beings develop their natures as rational creatures. So
when an individual chooses to act against the law of nature by committing murder, for
instance, he is not acting rationally; he is not obeying that which his reason tells him are
his duties. But as long as human beings make proper use of their mental faculties and
other essential features of their characters, they can arrive at certainty, i.e., moral and
mathematical truths. The natural law helps human beings to fulfill their essential natures;
142
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natural laws are good for human nature and certain duties do follow from man’s
constitution as a rational being. Locke argues that from the nature of man as a rational
being we can derive certain duties: to revere God, to promote justice, to have regard for
the property of others, to live in an ordered society with others.143 Thus, it is reason that
allows human beings both to ask and to answer the question about the source of moral
bindingness.
In this section, I have shown that by relaxing his commitment to empiricism,
Locke’s natural law theory of moral obligation can be modified in such a way as to
answer the two big questions: how do we know our moral obligations and what is the
source of their authority? With regard to the first question, Locke must simply adopt
Kant’s definition of human being as a rational being and my description of the a priori
demonstration of the general moral law as the rationalist foundation upon which to build
his a posteriori demonstration of specific moral obligations. This is a complete
explanation of how human beings come to know the natural moral law. With regard to
the second question, the repair of Locke’s theory is more complicated. Because moral
realism is weak on the question of what gives the law moral authority, Locke must
incorporate some standard for judging that the moral obligations that we derive are in fact
principles that guide us to do what is best. Locke thinks that there is an objective moral
standard that applies to us and is best for us because of certain facts about human nature
and certain facts about the world. Korsgaard lays out facts about human nature that Locke
can borrow to explain why it is good for us to do certain duties prescribed by the natural
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moral law. Human beings are the only creatures capable of evaluating actions according
to an objective standard and this capability is intuitive, it is impossible for us not to
evaluate our actions in such a way. Therefore, what gives the moral law authority is our
evaluation of our own actions according to the objective, natural moral law.
Finally, going back to the Lockeian test. This view remains a natural law theory
because it relies upon the principles of moral realism; it maintains that the connection
between human nature and the natural law is crucial for knowing and being bound by the
law; and it provides principles of practical reason according to which human beings
discover the guide to their behavior. Though Locke must give up his search for a pure
naturalist empiricism, accepting a Kantian rationalist foundation makes it possible to
demonstrate the natural moral law and given that the result is a more plausible natural
law theory of moral obligation, I would say that relaxing his commitment to empiricism
is a small price to pay.

V. Broader Implications
To conclude this chapter, I want to discuss some of the broader implications of
the theory of moral obligation I have put forward for Locke’s later works in order to
make explicit the connection between the two parts of this project. First, several of
Locke’s remarks in the Second Treatise clearly originate from the Essays. He discusses
the state of nature as having a law of nature governing it;144 and that the law of nature
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does not “cease in society,” rather, civil laws derive their justice from the natural law.145
Most notably, in chapter five of the Two Treatises in his discussion of property there are
several references to the early natural law theory. Here Locke builds his case that the
right to private property is part of the natural law and prior to civil society, the seeds of
which he sows in the eighth of his early essays.146 Also, political obligation, as I discuss
in the upcoming two chapters, is a species of moral obligation. So making sense of
Locke’s theory of political obligation presupposes that he has a coherent theory of moral
obligation as well. I will show that having a comprehensive theory of moral obligation is
essential for Locke’s consent theory of moral obligation. In the following chapter, I argue
for a natural duty to consent according to which individuals have a moral obligation to
consent to be bound by the civil law.
If the view I have defended here is correct, Locke comes closer to having a
complete theory of moral obligation than most scholars give him credit for. Thus, our
ultimate goal in this and the previous chapter has been to distinguish the salvageable parts
of Locke’s moral theory from those that cannot be saved and, using the precision of a
skilled surgeon, to reconstruct a whole theory combining the healthier parts with those
which Kant donates.
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Part II, Chapter Four:
Locke’s Theory of Political Obligation: A Reinterpretation
I. Introduction
According to the standard view, Locke endorses two separate theories of
obligation, one absolutist and the other voluntaristic.147 Whereas human beings are
morally bound to obey the natural law by their rational natures, they are morally bound to
obey civil laws only by their voluntary consent. On the surface, it seems that Locke
cannot consistently maintain both theories because absolutism and voluntarism seem
incompatible: if all moral duties derive from our shared rational human nature and bind
us precisely because we are rational, then there is no room for voluntarism—no room for
individual autonomy in deciding which moral duties are binding—at least not without
encroaching upon the supposed absolute authority of the natural law.148 If political
obligations are a subset of moral duties, then should they not also derive from our shared
rational human nature and bind us by nature, rather than by consent?
One obvious way to deal with the apparent incompatibility is to argue that natural
law and civil law have authority over different domains. In other words, some moral

147

This type of voluntarism ought not be confused with the normative theological voluntarism (or divine
command theory) I discuss in the previous two chapters with reference to the authority of moral
obligations. For the purposes of this and the following chapter, voluntarism refers to the view that special
obligations (i.e., those that are owed to a specific subset of people in contrast to natural duties that are owed
to all people) can only be acquired through the voluntary act of the agent to whom obligations then belong.
148

In fact, Locke himself acknowledges the incompatibility of voluntarism and the authority of natural
duties in his prohibition against allowing an individual to voluntarily sell himself into slavery. Voluntarily
choosing to hand over control of one’s body to another is impermissible because slavery is fundamentally
opposed to the natural law. According to the natural law we each have a natural right to private property,
which includes a right to our bodies (TT. II., §23).

89

duties are absolute and binding upon us because they derive from a universal law of
nature, while other moral duties are acquired and binding upon us only if we first
voluntarily agree to be so bound. This is a central claim of the standard account. And,
building upon this claim, advocates of the view argue that since natural laws neither
dictate the proper form of government nor particular civil statutes, it follows that political
obligation belongs to the latter category of special moral duties. Moreover, as a staunch
supporter of voluntarism regarding political obligation, Locke must have intended that his
consent theory exclude the universal moral imperatives associated with his natural law
theory.149 However, there is available a deeper interpretation of Locke’s theory of
political obligation which reveals this dichotomy to be perhaps one of the greatest
misapprehensions about Locke.
In this chapter, I challenge the standard interpretation of Locke’s theory of
political obligation and I argue that although consent is necessary and sufficient for
political obligation, there are nonetheless universal moral constraints upon the individual
choice to consent. Thus, though it is true that individuals are bound to obey only those
political institutions to which they have consented, there is a natural moral duty to
consent when certain conditions are met. These conditions are as follows. First, consent
must make it possible for an individual to satisfy more of his moral obligations than he
would if he failed to consent. This first condition requires a second: the political
institution in question, usually the state, must be reasonably just. Once these conditions
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are met, it is possible to criticize those who fail to consent for immoral, irrational, or
unprincipled reasons. On my interpretation, then, Locke views consent as the necessary
vehicle through which, most if not all, individuals living in civil society fulfill their
natural moral duties.
I proceed as follows. In section II, I raise a difficult conceptual challenge to the
standard view, i.e., consent is not a viable theory of political obligation because it gives
too much respect to those who fail to consent for unacceptable reasons, and I show that
appealing to Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent cannot stave off the objection. I also point
out two additional interpretive challenges to the standard view: natural duties limit
consent in Locke’s argument against selling oneself into slavery and in his views about
property acquisition. These two examples call into question Locke’s status as a steadfast
voluntarist. Then, in the third section, I defend my reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of
political obligation arguing that in addition to the moral obligation to obey the law
acquired through consent, he ought to introduce a meta-obligation governing the choice
to consent. Adopting this natural moral duty to consent would solve several problems.
First, it addresses the two interpretive challenges to the standard consent theory line
raised in section II. Second, it makes Locke’s theory of political obligation more
consistent with his view of the relationship between citizen and state and his defense of a
remedial right to revolution. In addition to these interpretive advantages, my
reconstruction of Locke’s theory of political obligation adequately responds to the
conceptual challenge to standard consent theory and has additional conceptual advantages
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over other popular contemporary theories of political obligation. Finally, in section IV, I
raise and respond to two objections to my interpretation.

II. Challenges to the Standard View
In the Second Treatise, Locke explains the origins of political society. This
project primarily concerns the two closely related questions of how and why an organized
community might emerge from a previously unorganized throng of individuals. The
simple answer to both questions is consent: the self-interested agreement among the
members of a putative group living in the state of nature to give up some of their
individual rights in exchange for the safety and security of living in civil society. Says
Locke, voluntary consent “puts Men out of a State of Nature [and] into that of a
Commonwealth.”150 So, Locke’s consent theory of political obligation is integral to his
developmental story about the creation and evolution of civil society.
The above explanation for the original establishment of an organized
commonwealth has the advantage of being simple and intuitively plausible; however, the
full narrative about how consent might also ensure the continued existence of such a
commonwealth is more complicated than this exchange of liberties for conveniences
initially conveys. For, if it were only self-interest, which depends upon the perceived
personal benefits gained from being a member of the group, that induced individuals to
enter a political community, then once one decides that the benefits of living within civil
society no longer outweigh the costs, it would seem that she is free to return to the state
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of nature regardless of whether the group has actually failed to uphold its part of the
exchange.151 This explanation, then, would leave open the real possibility of political
anarchy, which Locke wishes to avoid.152 Hence, in order to ensure the survival of
organized political communities, the agreement to become a member of a particular
community must carry certain responsibilities.
Fortunately, Locke recognizes this worry about self-interest as a motive for
entering civil society and clearly intends for the act of consent to be more than merely a
prudential exchange of liberties for conveniences. While one might initially choose to
enter civil society because he is motivated by self-interest, this choice has significant
normative consequences. The agreement among the members of a newly formed
commonwealth establishes a social contract, which morally binds all parties to perform
certain acts in accordance with their obligation to the group. Locke says that by choosing
to enter into civil society one “authorizes the Society…to make Laws for him as the
publick [sic] good of the Society shall require; to the Execution whereof, his own
assistance (as to his own Decrees) is due.”153 The choice to enter into a particular civil
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society is a sign that one accepts a moral obligation to obey the established rules of that
society, regardless of whether those rules actually serve his immediate personal interests,
and to treat those rules as if he himself had established them as a guide to his own
behavior and the behavior of his fellow citizens. Thus, the decision to enter into civil
society is not to be taken lightly. It is a pledge to recognize the authority of a particular
government and so long as that government fulfills its correlative moral obligations,
which it also acquires through the social contract, its constituents are not in fact justified
in returning to the state of nature. In this way, personal consent explains not only the
initial move from the state of nature into a commonwealth, but also the sustained
existence of the commonwealth composed of the original members and their obligations
to the group as a whole.154
The heart of the consent theorist’s doctrine, then, is the claim that “no man is
obligated to support or comply with any political power unless he has personally
consented to its authority over him.”155 Simply put, consent is necessary and sufficient
for political obligation. Thus, according to the standard interpretation of Locke’s consent
theory of political obligation, if we wish to know whether an individual is obligated to
obey the law of his state, the only relevant question to ask is whether he has consented.
Stated as such, consent theory has several advantages. First, consent is a simple and
direct way to evaluate whether an individual is politically obligated. Second, it provides
some indication of state legitimacy. Third, it explains government’s obligation to respect
154

Notice that explaining the sustained existence of the commonwealth and establishing the obligation to
obey the law for those born after the initial social contract will require the consent of future generations.
155

Simmons. Moral Principles and Political Obligations (1979), p. 57.

94

individual autonomy, which is central to the argument for representative democracy. Of
course, whether these admittedly oversimplified advantages are sufficient to recommend
consent as the solution to the problem of political obligation will depend upon a
comparison with the advantages of other possible solutions, but I do not wish to dwell on
the issue here. Suffice it to say that the advantages of consent theory are significant
enough to warrant consideration as a plausible theory of political obligation.156
However, despite its advantages there are also some serious objections to consent
theory. Perhaps the most widely known objection is what I call descriptive inadequacy:
the charge that most citizens living within any particular political society have not
consented and are, therefore, not obligated to obey their government. This objection
challenges the validity of actual consent on practical grounds. It says that although a
genuine act of consent, theoretically, would bind citizens to obey their governments, the
way in which actual citizens usually find themselves subject to a particular regime does
not allow for such acts of genuine consent and any proposed theory of political obligation
that fails to explain how most people are politically obligated surely ought to be rejected.
I address this first objection elsewhere.157
Here, though, I wish to focus upon a different objection: the charge that consent is
too permissive a theory of political obligation. The problem is that being committed to
political voluntarism means that there can be no moral constraints upon the choice to
consent. So, the objection goes, even if individuals could perform acts of genuine
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consent, consent itself is invalid as a theory of political obligation because it gives too
much credence to “immoral, irrational, and unprincipled failures to consent.”158
This second objection challenges consent on theoretical grounds. If consent is
necessary and sufficient for political obligation and there are no moral constraints upon
the choice to consent, then it seems that people could avoid acquiring certain moral
obligations without having any justification or even giving it any thought. But if the
obligation to obey the law can be so easily circumvented, then it is difficult to see in what
sense it is a moral obligation at all. That consent theory cannot adequately distinguish
between dissenters, who genuinely wish to withhold consent for principled reasons and,
therefore, arguably ought to be free of any political obligation, and non-consenters, who
simply fail to consent without having (good) reasons that might release them from their
political obligations, is a serious barrier to explaining how anyone might acquire a moral
obligation to obey the law.
The complaint that consent theory is too permissive can be fleshed out further in
terms of a type of free-rider problem, but not as it is usually understood. Hobbes clearly
lays out what we recognize as the classic free-rider problem in chapter XV of the
Leviathan where he discusses the fate of “the Foole.” The free-riding fool exploits others’
willingness to fulfill their moral obligations by strategically and, whenever possible,
surreptitiously violating his own moral obligations. He willingly breaks contracts that he
has voluntarily agreed to honor when doing so would be to his benefit and, consequently,
cannot be trusted to abide by the fundamental principles of a secure political community.
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Thus, allowing the free-rider to remain in civil society would be a violation of the natural
law of self-preservation and when he is discovered, Hobbes says, he must be cast out.
Now, the situation that best characterizes those who fail to consent without
adequate reasons is slightly different, though I think it is still correct to say that nonconsenters are free-riders of a particular sort. Similar to Hobbes’s description of the freerider problem and its exemplar, “the Foole,” the non-consenter seems to exploit those
who accept the moral authority of the law because she benefits from the security of a
system in which most individuals morally bind themselves. But, according to the standard
interpretation, non-consenters have not acquired a moral obligation to obey the law
precisely because they, unlike Hobbes’s “Foole,” have not voluntarily agreed to be so
bound. So on what grounds can we criticize those who fail to consent without offering
good reasons? What moral obligation have they violated if not the obligation to obey the
law?
An advocate of the standard view might answer the above questions by appealing
to Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent. He might argue that these so-called ‘non-consenters’
are free-riding in precisely the Hobbesian sense because by living within civil society and
enjoying the benefits that such an arrangement affords them, they are in fact implicitly
demonstrating their agreement to obey the laws of that political community. So-called
‘non-consenters’ have acquired the obligation to obey the law through tacit consent.
Therefore, when they subsequently fail to obey the law, they breach the social contract
that they have implicitly agreed to and they violate the corresponding moral obligation
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that they have acquired by their “very being” within that civil society.159 And again,
society has every right to criticize those who ignore their moral obligations.
In essence, the advocate of the standard consent view responds to the objection
that consent is overly permissive by saying that alleged ‘non-consenters’ cannot hide
behind the excuse that they have not (expressly) consented and are, therefore, not bound
to obey the law because they have in fact implicitly, but no less actually, consented in
choosing to remain. Being a non-consenter, according to the standard view, then, requires
more than merely failing to acknowledge that one is bound to obey the law; it requires
opting out of the system altogether it seems and because of the severe risks attached to
such a move, it is unlikely that anyone would do so without principled reasons. But even
if someone did opt out for immoral, irrational, or unprincipled reasons, he clearly would
not be free-riding. So, when we take into consideration Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent,
the over-permissive objection seems to lose its force; the standard view, in point of fact,
does not give too much respect to unjustified failures to consent. Instead, those who do
not expressly consent face two options: either they must demonstrate their genuine
dissent by openly protesting or leaving entirely or if they choose to remain in civil society
without voicing dissent, they must understand that they leave themselves open to being
treated as if they have actually consented.
However, this response does not entirely disarm the objection. First, tacit consent
is overly permissive in the opposite direction because rather than saying that no one or
almost no one consents to the state, it assumes that everyone in the territory at any given
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time has consented. Though advocates of the standard view are correct to pursue the
intuition that we can criticize non-consenters for somehow free-riding upon the backs of
those who openly consent, it is not true that non-consenters who remain within society
have, in any sense, agreed to obey the law. It seems that, according to Locke’s account of
tacit consent, one could unintentionally, but somehow voluntarily, accept the authority of
the state. However, one could easily drive on the highway, own a house, and reside
within the territory of a state (for example, if one were a political dissident) without ever
intending to consent or even recognizing that one might be politically obligated on
account of such actions. If Locke thinks that one may unintentionally consent, he surely
holds the wrong conception of consent.160 I maintain that consenting requires just as
much moral, rational, and principled reasoning as dissenting. By relying upon tacit
consent, the advocate of the standard consent theory view responds to the charge of overpermissiveness with over-permissiveness in the direction of the opposite extreme. The
more plausible solution lies somewhere in the middle.
Second, given the above difficulties with tacit consent, it may help to describe
Locke as advocating a slightly different view of political obligation whereby citizens
acquire a moral obligation to obey the law in exchange for the benefits gained from living
within society. This benefit view would allow Locke to avoid worries about whether
supposed ‘non-consenters’ have actually agreed to be politically obligated, while at the
same time remaining completely unaware of their obligation. The problem for advocates
of the standard interpretation, however, is that this would move Locke away from consent
160
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theory and toward a theory of political obligation based upon the benefits one gains from
living in civil society, a reciprocation theory.161 Whereas the essential feature of consent
theory is the voluntariness of one’s obligation, the essential feature of the reciprocation
theory is one’s having received certain benefits, regardless of whether she wishes to be so
benefitted.162 Thus, the advocate of the standard view cannot explain how it is possible to
criticize non-consenters, who free-ride by failing to politically obligate themselves,
without compromising Locke’s commitment to political voluntarism because both
Locke’s account of tacit consent and the modification of it as a reciprocation theory
eschew voluntarism.
It certainly looks as though the objection that consent is too permissive a theory of
political obligation cannot be easily addressed by the standard interpretation and I think
that this theoretical objection threatens consent theory in a way that advocates of that
view have overlooked. If this objection cannot be answered, Locke’s theory of political
obligation is in serious trouble. So a more plausible interpretation must explain how
Locke can avoid this objection. In the next section, I offer a reinterpretation of Locke’s
theory of political obligation and explain its advantages in this regard. But before I move
to my own interpretation, I wish to point out two other problems with the standard view.
In addition to the above conceptual issue, there are some perhaps surprising
interpretive problems with the standard view. First, it is not obvious that Locke is the
diehard voluntarist that proponents of the standard view make him out to be. Focusing
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upon consent as the only indication of whether one is bound to obey the law overlooks
the important role that moral duties play as a check upon individual choice in Locke’s
theory. He clearly recognizes that there are and ought to be limitations upon consent
when he argues that one cannot voluntarily sell oneself into slavery, for instance.163
Locke’s explanation for this position is as follows: because freedom is necessary to fulfill
one’s natural duty of self-preservation, one cannot consent to give up his freedom and
become the slave of another. Being bound by the natural law to preserve oneself, he says,
entails that human beings are not free to hand over absolute control of their lives to
another: “No body can give more Power than he has himself; and he that cannot take
away his own Life, cannot give another power over it.”164 Here we see the natural duty of
self-preservation trumping free choice. So, according to Locke, consent does not exclude
universal moral imperatives associated with natural law theory; on the contrary, one’s
natural moral duties limit the power to consent.
Additionally, even during his discussion of property—often cited by the most
ardent defenders of Locke’s voluntarism—natural duties play an important role. Because
Locke seems to argue so vehemently that property is such that “without a Man’s own
consent it cannot be taken away from him”165 and since he places so much emphasis upon
the protection of private property as a main reason for individuals to enter into civil
society in the first place, it is tempting to claim that he also thinks consent ought to be the
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sole basis for political obligation. Indeed, this has been almost exclusively the reading of
Locke’s theory of political obligation; however, there are good reasons to question this as
an overgeneralization.
Advocates of the standard view often have an exceedingly shallow account of
Locke’s state of nature as a state where individuals live according to their own rules. But
it is more than simply a state in which men are born free from political coercion; for
individuals living in the state of nature importantly are not absolutely free. They are
obligated by the law of nature to obey their natural duties, among them, to preserve
themselves and others, to treat people with respect, and to keep promises.166 Also, as I
mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, Locke does not intend for the natural law to
loosen entirely its grip upon man’s will once he crosses the threshold into civil society.167
On the contrary, Locke’s optimism about the influence of natural moral duties within the
political realm and the ability of human beings to limit themselves through their rational
natures, leads him to argue for the sufficiency of a limited and unobtrusive government.
According to Locke, natural duties limit all of our rights in the state of nature,
including the right to own property. In the first case, because God gave the resources of
the earth to all in common as necessary for their survival, making use of those resources
cannot be a matter requiring consent. In a sense, everyone has an equal claim to as much
as he needs for his own survival, but anything beyond the basic minimum must be limited
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by natural duties. So although it is not consent that limits our natural right to acquire
property in the state of nature, that right is not totally without boundaries. Locke
expresses this by specifying the two provisos limiting one’s right to acquire property.
First, the sufficiency proviso: that we must leave “enough, and as good…in common for
others.”168 Secondly, along the same lines, one must also be guided by the spoilage
proviso: no one may acquire more than he can make use of before his supply spoils. He
says that we are to keep within the “bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for [our]
use.”169
Though Locke relies heavily upon consent and natural rights in developing his
theory of property ownership, his basic position is this: in the state of nature where there
is a vast supply of unclaimed territory it is not necessary to secure the consent of others in
order to lay claim to property.170 However, once one has laid claim to a plot of land by
increasing its value through physical labor, he removes that piece of land from the
common and it then falls under the principle of consent. Once the piece of land is
privately owned, someone else may claim it only if the current owner agrees to transfer
his right of ownership to that other.171 Thus, our right to the acquisition of property in the
state of nature is not solely guided by consent; instead, it is the principle of justice and the
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bounds set by reason that determine the natural moral duties limiting our right to acquire
property. It is this natural sense of moral duty that I examine in the next section in order
to show that there is another more plausible interpretation of Locke’s political theory.
In this section, I have laid out a theoretical challenge to the standard consent
theory of political obligation and raised additional challenges to this view in the spirit of
Locke’s own reliance upon natural moral duties as limits to the individual power to
consent. The limits that Locke places upon consent as seen in his rejection of the
possibility of voluntarily selling oneself into slavery and in his principled limitations on
property acquisition in the state of nature call into question Locke’s unfaltering
commitment to voluntarism. Still, those who wish to read Locke as a consent theorist
about political obligation are right to emphasize the role that the state of nature plays in
his theory. It is his conception of the state of nature, where human beings live together,
their actions being bound by the law of nature, without any common superior (besides
God), that Locke understands as the background against which the aims of civil
government should be understood. Now I turn to my interpretation of Locke’s theory of
political obligation, which attempts to take into account the above problems with the
standard view and to place consent theory back on solid ground.

III. The Natural Moral Duty to Consent
In this section, I argue for a reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of political
obligation, which not only has interpretive advantages over the standard view,
acknowledging the limitations that Locke himself places upon consent and making his
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theory of political obligation more consistent with his general account of the relationship
between citizen and state and his support of a remedial right to revolution, but also has
distinct conceptual advantages as it is a better theory of political obligation overall. In
order for advocates of the standard consent theory line to maintain their view, they must
turn a blind eye toward anything that challenges Locke’s commitment to voluntarism and
in so doing, they adhere to a superficial account of Locke’s political theory.
On the one hand, the conventional account ignores the role that natural duties play
in defining the aims of the state. It emphasizes the personal safety and material security
offered by the state, but overlooks the important moral benefits that the state also
provides its citizens. This characterization makes the state seem primarily valuable only
as a tool for survival and increasing prosperity, as a sort of necessary evil, rather than as
an entity having moral value and being at least partially responsible for the moral
improvement of its members. While it is certainly the case that Locke views the state as
an instrument for securing life, liberty, and property,172 I argue that he also views it as
having a moral purpose. On the other hand, consent ignores the role that natural duties
play in defining the aims of citizens. Citizens are never completely free from the
imperatives of the natural law and so it is always possible to evaluate their actions on the
basis of their natural moral duties. But consent treats individuals as absolutely free with
regard to deciding whether to accept the moral obligation to obey the law. So the basic
standard consent account leaves some explanatory gaps and I aim to fill these gaps in
what follows.
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To begin, I sketch a rough comparison between my interpretation and the
interpretation I have been discussing in order to help us find our bearings. Like
proponents of the standard interpretation, I retain Locke’s categorical commitment to
actual, personal consent being necessary and sufficient for political obligation. But,
unlike proponents of the standard interpretation, I argue that over and above the moral
duty to obey the law that one acquires only after she has consented, given his other
commitments, Locke should accept an additional natural moral duty that guides the
individual decision to consent. This second, meta-obligation is a natural moral duty to
consent when certain conditions obtain and is key to condemning, as morally
impermissible, the failure to consent without (good) reasons.
I find support for this natural moral duty to consent in three sources. First, the
seeds of a theory of civil government according to which the state actually helps
individuals to fulfill their natural moral duties lie hidden in Locke’s description of human
nature and the state of nature. Though it is true that according to Locke’s vision of the
state of nature it is possible for individuals to be moral, it is also true that, given a
relatively just civil society, the majority of us would be morally better off living in civil
society than we would be living in the state of nature. The reason for this is not merely
that the state has the power to coerce individuals to comply with the law, but that the state
empowers individuals to make better moral decisions and recognizing the authority of the
state boosts individual accountability providing an additional reason to fulfill one’s moral
obligations. Thus, it is rational for individuals to consent in order to improve their
opportunities to be moral. Second, the natural moral duty to consent fits well with

106

Locke’s remedial right to revolution according to which revolution is only permissible
when the state has done something unjust. If there are conditions under which dissent is
obligatory, then it seems reasonable that there would be conditions under which consent
is obligatory. Third, my reconstructive approach is more charitable to Locke saving his
theory of political obligation from the charge of over-permissiveness and reviving
consent, albeit a qualified version of consent, as a plausible solution to the contemporary
problem of political obligation.
Making sense of a natural moral duty to consent first requires returning to
Locke’s vision of human nature and understanding how this affects Locke’s view of the
natural state of human beings. A close look at these features also will help clarify the
relationship between citizen and state. First, in his political works, Locke emphasizes that
human beings living in the state of nature are all born free from and equal to one another.
Beginning from what he regards as a common sense starting point, namely, that humans
are the creatures, dependents, and servants of God, Locke goes on to argue that God, as
the all-powerful creator, is in fact the only natural superior with the absolute right to
demand that his subjects do his will.173 So although human beings are naturally subject to
God, they are naturally subject to no earthly sovereign.174 Yet, even the earthly freedom
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that human beings enjoy is not absolute175 because in addition to being born with the
natural rights of freedom and equality, human beings are, by nature, rational and, as we
have seen, this reasoning capacity is a precondition for moral obligation.176 According to
Locke, the natural law is morally binding upon individual human beings because it is
discoverable by human reason and from this it follows that there is a natural moral law
governing the state of nature.177 Thus, human beings are born naturally subject to God
and their rational nature, combined with certain empirical facts about the world, makes
them naturally obligated to obey the natural moral law.
Recall that Locke’s naturalist empiricism briefly mentioned in the preceding
paragraph and examined at length in chapter three, exhibits a unique optimism about the
ability of human beings to uncover the content of the natural moral law simply by
observation and reflection. However, the previous examination of the problems with
Locke’s underdeveloped natural law theory and my reconstruction of a Lockeian moral
theory shows that this optimism does not take us very far. Still, though Locke thinks that
knowing one’s moral obligations is sufficient for moral authority, he need not be
committed to the stronger claim that knowing one’s moral obligations is also sufficient to
motivate one to fulfill those obligations. While Locke certainly thinks that discovering
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basic moral principles may be nearly an automatic task for rational beings, he also
acknowledges that actually living up to these principles is far from automatic. We can
imagine three potential problems arising: those who fail to fulfill their moral obligations
do so either because (1) they fail to discover the general principles of natural law; or (2)
they discover the general principles of natural law, but fail correctly to apply those
principles to specific circumstances in order to discover their particular moral
obligations; or (3) they manage both to discover general principles and particular moral
obligations, but through weakness of will are unable to perform the actions required by
their moral obligations. Each of these potential moral failures is a failure of rationality.
On Locke’s view, ordinary human beings rarely make the first mistake because
the general principles of natural law are precepts of common sense, principles such as ‘do
justice’ and ‘be charitable.’ He thinks that such general imperatives, what Kant calls
imperfect duties, are quite obviously correct and necessary for even minimal cooperation
among human beings living in common. Far more frequent are failures of the second and
third types, namely, problems related to applying general principles to specific
circumstances, e.g., ‘recognizing the just thing to do’ or ‘understanding what the
principle of charity demands given this particular set of circumstances’, and mistakes
arising from a weak will. Not only must individuals contend with an epistemic challenge:
applying an unwritten, general natural law to everyday scenarios with many different and
constantly changing variables, but they must also deal with several will-defeating factors.
Various opinions, contrary interests, and the instinctual drive toward partiality all hinder
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the ability of individuals to fulfill their moral obligations, natural or otherwise.178 So
while Locke is clearly optimistic about the ability of all individuals to discover the basic
principles of the natural moral law through their natural reasoning capacities, he is also
aware of the features of human nature that can become barriers to living according to
these principles.
Nonetheless, some, the most rational among us, are able to know the natural law,
properly apply it, and set aside personal biases, etc. in order to fulfill their moral
obligations. Admittedly, such reasonable persons are few, but if even ideally rational
creatures were neither able to properly apply the natural law nor fulfill their moral
obligations, it seems that Locke could not intelligibly speak about the differential moral
capacities of individuals179 or the applicability of the natural law in the state of nature.
Evidently, then, not all are misled by their inability to apply the natural law or by their
passions and interests.180 Yet, because the reasoning capacity varies so widely among
individuals, others, and perhaps the majority of individuals fail to fulfill their moral
obligations when faced with ordinary moral challenges. Thus, it is not skepticism about
the ability to know the imperatives of the natural law, but rather doubt about the ability to
apply them and to maintain control over one’s passions that Locke thinks is the main
cause of moral failure.
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Moreover, certain aspects of the state of nature intensify these difficulties. Locke
says that in the state of nature every person is judge for himself and every person has the
executive power to enforce the law of nature;181 these factors surely increase the potential
for individuals to fail to satisfy their natural moral duties. Were all human beings ideally
rational, the natural state of man, in which each individual judges himself against the
natural law but is also subject to all others insofar as everyone has the power to punish
him if he violates the law, would be a perfectly just and peaceful state. However, all
human beings are not ideally rational and I think Locke underestimates the difficulty of
being moral given the wealth of individual control and the scarcity of individual
accountability in the state of nature. If all have equal rights to both judge and enforce the
law of nature without limitation, there is little incentive to hold oneself to high moral
standards and injustices will inevitably occur. The two most common barriers to fulfilling
one’s moral obligations, the epistemic challenge and weakness of will, have no remedy
within the state of nature as Locke envisions it; rather, the state of nature appears to be a
prisoners’ dilemma as Hobbes describes it. Thus, in the state of nature there is no security
against either the innocent being punished or the guilty being disproportionately
punished.
Whereas there is little doubt that the state of nature poses special challenges to the
capacity for individuals to fulfill their moral obligations, organized civil society actually
helps to alleviate the most common problems that prevent citizens from fulfilling their
moral obligations. In the state of nature, the laws are not written down and there is no
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impartial judge to adjudicate disputes; for Locke makes it clear that because the natural
law is “unwritten, and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of Men, they who through
Passion or Interest shall mis-cite it, or misapply it, cannot be so easily convinced of their
mistake where there is no establish’d Judge.”182 Therefore, those who are most rational
have a distinct advantage over those who are less astute in applying the general principles
of the natural law to particular situations. By contrast, civil society minimizes the effects
of this disparity among rational individuals. By consulting civil laws that are written by
those who are most capable of figuring out which laws best serve the natural law and,
thus, the common good, ordinary individuals can gain access to particular moral laws.
Civil laws, when they are properly generated, then, serve as the particular application of
the general natural law providing plain access to individual moral obligations.
Additionally, epistemic challenges plague even the most well-intentioned
individuals in the state of nature because, without an impartial judge to adjudicate
interpretive disputes, disagreements are bound to arise and given the universal executive
power to enforce the law of nature, even these relatively minor disputes could have grave
and far-reaching consequences, as enemies rarely agree upon the definition of a
proportional response. However, just states give individuals an opportunity to settle their
disputes about the law in court in front of an impartial third-party, who has the authority
to clarify the law and settle interpretive disagreements. Also, with all individuals
transferring to the state their universal executive right to enforce the law of nature by
punishing those who violate it, minor disagreements concerning what an appropriate
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punishment for a particular crime might be are contained and settled before they cause
major harm. Institutionalizing judgment and enforcement of the law simply allows
members of a group to avoid coordination problems stemming from epistemic mistakes
that would otherwise result in escalating tensions.
Also, the state helps to make individuals moral by minimizing the affects of
particular will-defeating aspects of human nature. I mentioned above the variety of
opinions, the contrariety of interests, and the drive toward partiality, all of which
encourage individuals to focus upon themselves and those closest to themselves; such
focus can easily lead to disputes in the state of nature. Here again the influence of the
state counteracts the effects of these natural differences among individuals by taking on
some of the responsibility for security and by settling disputes. The state also provides an
extra incentive to strengthen the will, i.e., the fear of punishment. One of the great
advantages of civil society over the state of nature is that a just civil society guarantees
that one’s moral obligations line up with one’s self-interests much of the time. Therefore,
entering into civil society makes satisfying one’s moral obligations easier. In fact, Locke
says: “were it not for the corruption, and vitiousness of degenerate Men, there would
be…no necessity that Men should separate from this great and natural Community, and
by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.”183
Now although the above proves that through the enforcement of compliance with
civil laws, the state solves coordination problems that create injustices and provides
incentives for less rational individuals to fulfill their moral obligations, I have not yet
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proven that citizens have a natural moral duty to agree to be morally obligated to obey the
law. So it is not enough to show that there is a natural moral duty to consent. Compliance
with the law and obedience to the law are distinguished by two different psychological
states within the mind of the agent. Whereas it is possible for me to comply with the law
purely by accident, e.g., when my actions happen to correspond with the law’s command,
or for reasons completely unrelated to recognition of the authority of the state, e.g., fear
of punishment, I only obey the law when I take the existence of the law itself as a reason
to do what the law requires. But whereas the actions of one who complies with the law
and one who obeys the law often coincide, it is the intentions that indicate one’s level of
commitment to the law.
To illustrate this important distinction further, let us look at an analogy. Suppose I
decide to hire a personal trainer at my gym who gives me advice about how to stay
healthy and keep my body in good condition. He tells me that for best results I should eat
a balanced diet, drink at least eight glasses of water each day, get plenty of rest, and do at
least an hour of cardiovascular training four days each week and an hour of weight
training two days each week. Now I could follow his advice for several reasons. I might
simply enjoy working out and eating well; I might want to take care of my body to
impress my friends; I might want to relieve stress and become healthier so I can live
longer; or I might recognize that by following the recommendations of the trainer, who is
an expert in his field, I am most likely to meet goals such as improving my health and
staying in shape.
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Only acting upon the final reason listed would count as an act of obedience
because here I recognize the trainer’s authority and I see that his expertise gives me what
I need to meet my goals. But beyond the fact that it would be prudent for me to hire the
trainer, since statistically I would be more likely to succeed following his
recommendations than I would be going for it on my own, there is another reason that I
might hire a personal trainer. Having to check-in each week with a trainer, whose job it is
to hold me accountable to work to meet my goals, provides a psychological component:
an additional incentive for me to obey the rules that I would not have were I accountable
only to myself. This psychological component can be the crucial difference between
success and failure; indeed, this is surely a common rationale for hiring a personal trainer.
Therefore, just as I might choose to hire a personal trainer to provide expertise and
accountability in order to help me to do what is required to become healthier, I might also
choose to consent to the state because it also provides expertise and accountability to help
me do what is required to become more moral.
The difference between the two cases is that while I do not have a natural moral
duty to keep my body in excellent condition,184 I do have a natural moral duty to do what
I can to make myself more moral. If I recognize the general moral principle that I ought
not cause harm to others185 and I recognize that I sometimes fail to satisfy my moral
obligations because I incorrectly apply this general principle to particular situations or my
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will succumbs to my passions, then I should also recognize an obligation to do whatever I
can to prevent these, and similar, failures of rationality. As we have seen, entering into
civil society is one successful strategy for preventing these types of failures of rationality,
but merely agreeing to comply with the law is not enough, since compliance is unreliable
being contingent upon accidental factors, such as whether my self-interests coincide with
the demands of the law. Instead, I owe to my fellow citizens an obligation to obey the
law. Only a promise to obey the law of one’s state provides the requisite stable
psychological component ensuring others that I respect the harm principle and that I am
committed to limiting the harm that my failure to fulfill my moral obligations could cause
them. Therefore, Locke is committed to thinking that most, if not all, individuals living in
civil society owe their fellow citizens a natural moral duty to politically obligate
themselves—a natural duty to consent.
The natural moral duty to consent also makes Locke’s theory of political
obligation more consistent with his defense of a remedial right to revolution. According
to Locke, the only way in which ordinary individuals can directly check the political
judgment of their governments is by means of revolt. The decision to start a revolution
ought not to be taken lightly, however, for it is justified or condemned by the natural law
and is not a matter of will, but of right.186 Once again, we see Locke using the natural law
to limit the individual’s decision; here, though, the topic is not the individual choice to
consent but rather the circumstances under which it would be appropriate to dissent.
Thus, I agree with the overwhelming majority of Locke scholars who argue that he
186
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embraces a remedial right to revolution meaning that revolution is only justified when the
state has egregiously harmed those who have agreed to its authority.187
Nevertheless, it is the most important political right that human beings enjoy
because it rests upon the principle of self-preservation and is justified by the principle of
natural equality. Giving up their unlimited individual rights to enforce the laws of nature,
members of a community, instead, agree to be bound by a contract under which they
transfer some of their individual authority to the sovereign ruler. As a result of this social
contract, then, the ruler has certain obligations in virtue of his authority, namely to
protect basic rights and to guard the common interest of the citizens living within the
commonwealth. As long as the ruler continues to uphold his end of the agreement, his
authority remains legitimate and citizens are bound to obey the laws. However, whenever
the ruler governs according to his own interests, rather than those of the governed, he
effectively forfeits his right to rule; and whenever he demonstrates his intention to usurp
the basic rights of the governed, he forfeits something much more serious, his right to be
treated as a peace-loving individual.188 This constitutes an injustice done to those whom
the state is most required to protect and guide and demonstrates Locke’s defense of a
remedial right to revolution. Says Locke, “Force is to be opposed to nothing, but to
unjust and unlawful Force; whoever makes any opposition in any other Case, draws on
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himself a just Condemnation both from God and Man.”189 When the ruler breaks the
contract by overstepping the bounds of his authority, he has set himself up as a tyrant—of
no more use to the community than a pirate or a robber.
Finally, this reinterpretation of Locke’s theory of political obligation has several
advantages over the standard interpretation and charity urges that we attribute to Locke
the best interpretation available. First, the natural moral duty to consent responds to the
theoretical and interpretive challenges raised in the previous section. It allows us to
criticize those who fail to consent for unacceptable reasons because such individuals
really are failing to uphold a particular moral obligation that does in fact bind them.
Because this moral obligation is a natural moral obligation, we need not worry about
whether non-consenters have acquired such an obligation. The moral obligation to
consent binds all rational individuals by nature. Still, we cannot criticize non-consenters
for failing to uphold their moral duty to obey the law; rather it is the meta-obligation of
the duty to consent that they fail to uphold and it is on the basis of this that we may
criticize them as free-riders. Also, this interpretation not only responds to the objection
that consent theory is too permissive and is consistent with the qualifications that Locke
himself places upon consent (in his doctrines of the impermissibility of selling oneself
into slavery and property acquisition), but also is neither divorced from nor opposed to
his early natural law theory of moral obligation. So it also has the advantage of making
Locke’s corpus more internally consistent nicely blending his natural law theory with his
theory of political obligation.
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Second, the natural duty to consent is the best theory of political obligation given
all of the options. All of the prevailing theories supporting the contention that there is a
moral obligation to obey the law have serious flaws, the most important of which being
that even theories that explain the obligation to treat one’s fellow citizens well, cannot
explain how that obligation could be owed to the state. In other words, they cannot
explain the moral authority of the state. The natural moral duty to consent has the
advantage of giving the state independent moral authority because though individuals
owe the duty to consent to their fellow citizens, they cannot fulfill that duty without also
becoming obligated to obey the state. I do not have space to defend this claim further
here, but I fully defend it next, in chapter five.
In sum, were it possible for all individuals to observe and apply the natural law
perfectly, we would all live together in the state of nature united by universal obedience
to the natural law. But as it is, the majority of individuals need civil laws to guide them in
their quest to fulfill their moral obligations. Indeed, the less rational ones, who tend to
make mistakes that prevent them from fulfilling their moral obligations, would have
virtually no chance at being moral were it not for the existence of the more rational. But
in order for the more competent students of the natural law to teach those who are less
competent, they need a suitable instrument to convey their wisdom. Political obligation is
such an instrument.
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IV. Objections
In this final section, I address two objections to my view. First, even if I have
shown that the less competent student of natural law has a moral obligation to consent,
why should the more competent one politically obligate herself? After all, if the more
competent individuals are capable of fulfilling their moral obligations without the
psychological benefit of consenting to the state what moral reason do they have for
entering into civil society or politically obligating themselves? Second, if the less
competent student of the natural law is less competent because she has trouble applying
the natural law, how can she determine whether the civil laws of her state have been
properly written to reflect the natural law or whether her state is just or whether her state
has the expertise or can even provide the accountability ensuring that obedience will
make her more moral? In short, how can the morally inept individual be certain that the
conditions are met under which she has a natural moral duty to consent? Determining the
correct answer to any of these questions seems to require the ability to apply the natural
law.
I respond, first, that the moral saints among us, obviously, have prudential reasons
to enter into civil society. So it is not as if they would have absolutely no reason to leave
the state of nature or be tempted to cloister themselves away from the rest of civil society.
But beyond the merely prudential, they too have moral reasons. As extraordinarily
competent students of the natural moral law, they should recognize that even if
consenting to the state would not make them personally more moral, they have an interest
in increasing justice in the world by helping those to whom satisfying their moral
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obligations does not come so easily. They have a duty as moral exemplars to provide the
expertise and accountability that others require in order to fulfill their moral obligations.
Furthermore, Locke recognizes a moral duty not only to self-preservation, but also to the
preservation of mankind190 and it is difficult to see how one might discharge such a duty
without entering into civil society. Of course, even in the state of nature I could discharge
this duty by feeding my starving neighbor, once I have provided for my family and
myself, but it seems clear that, especially regarding this particular moral duty, more
justice could be done collectively. So it is reasonable to think that the pursuit of justice
would lead the most rational as well as the least rational to enter into civil society.
As for the second objection I reply first, although those who are less rational often
fail to properly apply the natural law, they are not necessarily incapable of recognizing
when others apply the natural law properly. Just as I might know certain nutritional
guidelines and rules of exercising, but fail to apply those rules properly, and nonetheless
be capable of distinguishing better and worse trainers, e.g., by the results I see in others
who employ them, those who often fail to apply the natural law correctly may
nonetheless be capable of distinguishing just and unjust states. Also, though some may
have trouble discerning the just thing to do in specific and complicated circumstances,
they may have no trouble discerning justice in the broad strokes. Remember that,
according to Locke, even those who make mistakes in applying the natural law, or fail
due to weakness of will, are as capable as others of discovering the general principles of
natural law. Given that Locke thinks that everyone is capable of recognizing when the
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natural law is being correctly interpreted, there is no reason to presume that those who
need the state for moral improvement will be incompetent judges of justice, especially
when it comes to recognizing whether their state has engaged in an injustice against
themselves.
Also, although each particular society will contain only a few of the nearly ideal
reasoners, not all of those will end up in positions of leadership within the government.
So rational individuals outside of such leadership positions have a responsibility to
educate their fellow citizens about the moral benefits of the state and the best ways to
fulfill their moral obligations to others. It is up to them to help others to recognize their
natural moral duty to consent.
In conclusion, the civil law is the instrument by means of which most individuals
succeed in satisfying their moral obligations. Without the existence of civil laws and the
prevalence of those who are competent to derive civil laws from the natural law, most
would be incapable of exercising justice except, perhaps, by accident. Therefore, there is
a natural moral duty to consent that will allow ordinary individuals to fulfill their moral
obligations and placing this limit upon consent makes Locke’s theory of political
obligation more palatable.
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Part II, Chapter Five:
Political Obligation:
The Anarchist Challenge and the Natural Duty to Consent
I. Introduction
In the previous chapter I offer an alternative interpretation of Locke’s theory of
political obligation according to which Locke’s concept of consent is more accurately
understood as a natural duty than as a prudential exchange of liberties for conveniences.
Though perhaps interesting in its own right, this interpretive point would be of little
consequence if the theory itself turns out to be philosophically untenable. Thus, in this
final chapter, I move beyond the interpretive question to assessing the credibility of the
natural duty to consent as a theory of political obligation. I argue that, in light of the
anarchist challenge, we ought to revisit the possibility that express consent could ground
political obligation and I show that the natural duty to consent stands as a formidable
contender in the political obligation debate.
The contemporary debate concerning what has been called the problem of
political obligation hopes to answer the following question: is there a duty to obey the
law? At first blush, the answer seems so obvious as to be trivial. Of course individuals
have a duty to obey the law, since that just is what it means for there to be law: laws
bestow duties upon the individuals to whom they apply.191 However, the substantive
191
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philosophical issue that I wish to discuss here does not concern the nature of law or the
rule of law; rather, the true controversy driving this debate surrounds the normative
grounding for legal duties. So the real question is: is there a moral duty to obey the law?
The task, then, for those, including myself, who wish to defend an account of political
obligation, is to explain this moral obligation by answering several additional questions:
how is it that one is obligated to obey the laws of one’s state? Does such an obligation
come about because of the nature of political institutions or the nature of citizenship,
neither, both? Is the individual obligation to obey the law grounded in one’s transactions,
one’s associations, or one’s natural duties?192
The worry about justifying obedience to the law is nothing new; in fact, it is
nearly as old as philosophy itself. Plato raises the issue in the Crito when Socrates refuses
to escape from prison after having been convicted and condemned to death by an
Athenian jury. In defense of his decision to remain in prison and face execution, Socrates
offers several arguments, which, though admittedly underdeveloped, hint at various
theories of political obligation that remain live options still today.193 Of the various
theories suggested by Plato, the one that has received perhaps the most attention from
later philosophers is social contract or consent theory, the full development of which
occurs in the seventeenth century with Hobbes and Locke.
Consent may be described as the most intuitively appealing and purest form of
political obligation because of its similarity to the social practice of making promises.
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Just as promising involves one individual granting moral authority to another, thereby
establishing for himself a moral obligation, consenting involves an individual directly
transferring moral authority to a political institution, thereby establishing a moral
obligation for himself. In both cases, one party deliberately and voluntarily accepts moral
obligation by granting moral authority to the other party. It is difficult to deny that such a
deliberate and voluntary act could bestow moral obligation upon the actor.194 If I promise
to water your plants while you are on vacation, for example, it seems clear that I have
bound myself to water your plants every so often and it seems clear that if I fail to do so,
I have wronged you; I have failed to discharge one of my moral obligations. Similarly, if
I consent to obey a law that says I may not smoke in hospitals, but later decide to light up
while visiting my hospitalized cousin, I fail to discharge one of my moral obligations. By
consenting, I have morally bound myself to obey the law and if I disobey, I have morally
wronged the state. So consent seems to explain well how one might acquire a moral duty
to obey the law.
But despite its initial appeal, we have seen that the consent theory of political
obligation faces serious objections. In the previous chapter, while discussing a theoretical
objection to consent theory, i.e., the over-permissive objection, I mentioned that the main
objection to consent theory is a practical one. The worry is not that consent differs from
promising in that an act of genuine consent might somehow fail to create moral
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obligation; but rather, that consent is not a “suitably general ground for political
obligation”195 because, unlike the social practice of making promises, few, if any, citizens
actually perform such acts of genuine consent. In other words, consent theory, as a theory
of political obligation, is descriptively inadequate because it fails to accurately represent
the way most individuals find themselves under the jurisdiction of political institutions.
In the second section below, I discuss this practical objection to consent theory.
Recently and largely in response to the descriptive inadequacy claim against
consent theory, three main camps have emerged. First, there are those who defend the
concept of political obligation by attempting to modify consent theory196 or by offering
other transactional accounts of political obligation.197 Second, there are political
philosophers who accept the descriptive inadequacy objection as fatal not only for
consent theory, but for all transactional accounts alike and so argue for a moral duty to
obey the law on other grounds, i.e., norms tied to citizenship198 or some natural duty.199
Finally, there are anarchists who are skeptical of the whole concept of political obligation
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and reject any theory claiming that individuals have independent moral reasons to obey
the law and, more importantly, any theory claiming that states have moral authority as a
result of these independent moral reasons.200
In what follows, I explain the descriptive inadequacy objection to consent theory
in the second section. Then, beginning with section III, I evaluate the prevailing attempts
to show that there is a moral duty to obey the law and I conclude that while some possible
theories of political obligation clearly have advantages over others, none is completely
successful. So the anarchist challenge looms large (section IV). I argue that, in light of
this, we ought to revisit the possibility that express consent could ground political
obligation. Finally, I explain the advantages of my own theory, the natural duty to
consent, and offer reasons for thinking that this evolution of standard consent theory
deserves further attention as a possible solution to the problem of political obligation in
the fifth section.

II. The Case Against Consent Theory: Descriptive Inadequacy
Since the emergence of modern liberal democracies, the belief that political
authority depends upon the consent of the governed has gained wide acceptance.
However, relatively few political philosophers actually defend consent as a viable theory
of political obligation. In this section, I explore the reasons for this disconnect.
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According to Locke’s familiar account of consent theory, there are two ways one
may consent: expressly or tacitly. On the one hand, express consent consists in one
performing an explicit, voluntary act demonstrating agreement to the terms of a contract
and acknowledgment of one’s obligations, e.g., signing a lease to rent an apartment or
swearing an oath. On the other hand, one tacitly consents by withholding dissent, but
only under the right conditions, e.g., the home owners’ association votes to repave all of
the driveways in my neighborhood unless someone objects, and the group notifies
everyone who may be affected that any objections must be put in writing and delivered
before the end of the month. If at the end of the month no one has objected, everyone in
the neighborhood has tacitly consented to having her driveway repaved.201 In these and
similar ordinary scenarios, consent proves to be a quite common and reasonable way of
accepting certain types of obligation. However, it seems that the same cannot be said for
consent in political contexts. Those who criticize Locke’s view argue that, even leaving
aside the question of whether citizens actually perform acts of genuine consent, it is
simply not clear that citizens ever even find themselves in circumstances under which it
would be appropriate to consent, either expressly or tacitly, to their governments.202 Still,
before we accept defeat so quickly on Locke’s behalf, we ought to investigate the merits
of actions often pointed to as indicative of one’s consent and acceptance of political
obligation.
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First, political participation is often taken to be a signal of express consent.203 The
claim is that, given that certain fairness conditions are met, anyone who participates in a
political procedure by, for instance, voting in a presidential election, demonstrates his
intent to abide by the results of that procedure and his acceptance of the moral duty to
obey the law. According to this argument, casting a ballot on election-day is the political
equivalent of signing a contract promising to abide by the rules and regulations of the
particular political community of which one is a member. More specifically, voting is a
sign of one’s agreement with the presupposition that the majority decision binds all
participants, even those who happen to be in the voting minority. This account contains
elements of a reasonable model of political voluntarism because assuming that the
election is fair and effective, voting is a voluntary undertaking and a fair procedure for
political decision-making. Nevertheless, the most that the political participation account
can show is that political participation creates an obligation to abide by the outcome of a
particular election, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient for political obligation in
general.204
There are four main criticisms of the political participation view. (1) Voting
cannot be necessary for political obligation because we do not think that individuals who
do not have the legal right to vote (e.g., immigrants or foreign visitors) or who do not
have the opportunity to vote in some elections (e.g., individuals who come of voting age
between election years) are, as a result, free from political obligation. (2) Further, voting
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is not necessary for political obligation because if (1) is correct, it is not the act of
political participation that creates the obligation, but rather something about the fairness
of the procedure itself and voting in democratic elections is surely not the only fair
political procedure available. (3) Along the same lines, voting cannot be sufficient to
ground political obligation; for, it is not the voting itself, but rather the agreement to
abide by the outcome that creates the obligation. While voting for Barack Obama may be
an indication of one’s willingness to grant him moral authority over oneself, political
obligation requires more than agreeing to abide by the commands of a particular ruler.
This is precisely the concern that gives rise to the fourth and strongest criticism of the
political participation view. (4) Voting is not sufficient because it cannot explain why
citizens are bound to obey the founding documents or signify agreement with the
fundamental principles or form of their governments. Even if we assume that voting in a
particular election indicates one’s acceptance of an obligation to abide by the outcome of
that election and maybe even the outcomes of other sufficiently similar elections, that
does not imply that one accepts the outcomes of all other democratic procedures.205 As a
result, if I do not have the opportunity to change the system by which political decisions
are made, I cannot accept those decisions as binding because I have not consented to the
system itself.
The four above claims cast doubt upon the idea that political participation is either
necessary or sufficient to create political obligation. So with the soundness of this
account called into question, the descriptive inadequacy claim against consent theory is
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strengthened. While express consent may work in the context in which Locke most
readily discusses it, i.e., for individuals born into the state of nature, who then decide to
join together to form a commonwealth and government from the ground up, the prospects
for using consent as a justification for political obligation in general look grim. No
citizens existing after this initial social contract (except perhaps naturalized citizens) have
ever expressly consented to their governments. Therefore, it appears that, unless we can
find an alternative theory of political obligation, no citizen existing after this initial social
contract is politically obligated.
Because of the glaring problems with express consent, it is tempting instead to
turn to tacit consent and this is precisely the move that Locke makes in response to the
descriptive inadequacy objection;206 however, as we have already seen, tacit consent has
problems of its own. In the preceding chapter, I show that tacit consent cannot solve the
theoretical objection that express consent theory is overly permissive (releasing
individuals from their moral obligations to obey the law without sufficient reason)
because Locke’s doctrine of tacit consent seems to allow that one could unintentionally,
though somehow voluntarily accept the authority of the state. Tacit consent, then, is
overly permissive in the opposite direction because it assumes that everyone has in fact
consented. For similar reasons, tacit consent cannot save Locke’s theory of political
obligation from the practical objection here. Recall that Locke contends that ordinary
acts, such as using the roads, owning land, and residing in a territory, either temporarily
or permanently, are examples of tacit consent. In short, he says that it is the “enjoyment”
206
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of any conveniences resulting from a stable political system that bind citizens to
obedience.207 But, once again, this view assumes that one’s enjoyment of conveniences is
an indication of one’s acceptance of an obligation and without the awareness of having
given one’s acceptance, I fail to see how such ordinary actions could be indications of
one’s tacitly consenting to anything. Such a conception of tacit consent lacks the element
of voluntarism that supposedly justifies the state’s moral authority on this view.208
Today, few political theorists continue to claim that enjoying the benefits of
residency is a sign of consent209 because most recognize that there are a number of
contingent, but no less decisive, factors that severely limit or in some cases completely
eclipse one’s exit options making voluntarily residing in a particular territory all but
impossible. Individuals have strong reasons for not leaving their homeland even when
there is severe oppression: some may believe that it is better to work to change the system
from within, many do not want to leave their families, neighbors, and homes behind,
many cannot afford to pack up everything and move, neighboring states may be unwilling
to take in immigrants, etc. Because of these hardships, many argue that the excessive
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sacrifices attached to emigration make the choice to remain a choice in name only.210
Once again it appears that the conditions that must be in place in order for one to consent
simply do not hold. Thus, it seems that tacit consent meets the same fate as express
consent; both fail to be adequate explanations for the alleged political obligation of most
citizens.

III. Responses to Descriptive Inadequacy
Many political philosophers are convinced that, despite its intuitive appeal, the
descriptive inadequacy of consent theory takes it completely out of the running as a
prospective theory of political obligation. The main worry is that if we accept what seems
undeniable, that under the status quo few citizens ever have an opportunity to voluntarily
consent to obey their own states, we must also grant that most are in fact not obligated to
obey the law. And, at this point, we concede the debate to the anarchists. So, virtually all
recent defenders of political obligation assume that all citizens of at least reasonably just
states are non-voluntarily obligated to obey the law and they take their task to be
explaining how this could be the case.
As I say in the first section, the descriptive inadequacy claim against consent has
met with responses from three different groups: those who defend modified versions of
consent or other transactional accounts, those who seek grounding for political obligation
outside of transactional accounts, and those who altogether deny that individuals are
politically obligated. In this and the following section, I make the case for each of the
210
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prevailing attempts to solve the problem of political obligation and I identify the main
anarchist criticisms of each.
First, because Locke’s concept of tacit consent amounts to very littlebecoming
so watered down that he takes almost any action or at least any exercise of freedom
within an organized state to be a sign of consent and, thus, a grounding of political
obligationsome who study Locke question his status as a traditional consent theorist.
Hanna Pitkin is perhaps the most well known of those who hold such a view.211 She
argues that if Locke thinks that residing within a particular territory is sufficient to
demonstrate consent, he is committed to an absurd position. Consent through residency
entails that those living in a territory controlled by a tyrant consent to tyranny, but Locke
claims that it is impossible to be bound to obey any despotic government, since tyrannical
actions strip a ruler of his political authority rendering the social contract between ruler
and citizen null and void.212 Therefore, holding such a view would be a contradiction for
Locke.
In order to save Locke from such absurdity, Pitkin argues that he must intend tacit
consent to be a special type of consent given only to “the terms of the original contract
which the founders of the commonwealth made.”213 Therefore, one may agree to obey
certain laws within the territory of a tyrannical government (i.e., those just laws that
resulted from the original contract) without consenting to the rule of the current regime in
211
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power. She concludes that Locke did not really intend personal consent to be the ground
of political obligation; instead, she interprets Locke as claiming that our obligations arise
from the merits of the original contract. In other words, the basis of political obligation is
not an actual voluntary agreement, but the moral quality of the government or laws in
question, which is determined by what current rational citizens would hypothetically
agree to and by what past rational citizens did in fact agree to. In this way, Pitkin’s
interpretation bypasses descriptive inadequacy because she grants that individuals do not
actually consent, but argues that they need not do so in order to be bound. Instead,
citizens are bound by hypothetical consent, i.e., what they would have consented to if
they had been given the opportunity.
David Estlund in his recent book, Democratic Authority,214 defends a variation of
Pitkin’s hypothetical consent theory, which he calls normative consent. According to
Estlund, (just) governments have the moral authority to enforce the laws they create
because individuals are bound to obey certain forms of government for normative
reasons. Since there is no moral reason to think that one should escape the obligation to
obey by immorally withholding one’s consent, individuals are bound on the basis of what
they would be expected to consent to if they were acting morally.215 Relying upon the
principle of epistemic proceduralism, Estlund argues that it is the tendency of democratic
procedures to yield correct decisions that accounts for “the degree of authority that we
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think [they] should have.”216 Thus, he takes seriously the fourth criticism raised in the
previous section against the political participation view: if citizens are politically
obligated, it cannot be because the outcome of any particular political procedure is
correct, rather, it must be because the procedure itself, being fair and effective, generally
yields correct or just results.
The final modification of consent theory that I want to look at here is Harry
Beran’s reformed consent theory. Beran argues that consent could be a viable basis for
political obligation provided that we make certain significant, but feasible reforms to the
structure of our political systems.217 Among the reforms required to make consent a
reasonable grounding of political obligation, he mentions (a) there must be a legal right to
emigrate; (b) secession must be constitutionally permitted; and (c) a dissenters’ subterritory ought to be created.218 Beran also thinks that such reforms could be achieved
only within representative democracies that have a political education system that teaches
the importance of membership in democratic societies, the elements of which include: (a)
that the democratic state is a voluntary association; (b) that the ultimate right of political
decision-making rests with all of the adult members of the society; (c) that remaining in
the territory after one legally comes of age reflects acceptance of membership and
thereby is an expression of political obligation; (d) that taking part in elections places one
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under an obligation to accept the outcome determined by the majority vote; and (e) that
the obligations mentioned in (c) and (d) may be overridden by other moral
considerations.219 His conclusion is that these reforms are necessary to make consent
descriptively adequate. Were such reforms put into practice, being a member of a
political system would be an appropriate indication of consent and acceptance of political
obligation.
Besides variations on consent theory, there are other theories of political
obligation belonging to the same category known as transactional accounts. One such
transactional view is the fairness or benefit theory.220 George Klosko, the main proponent
of this view, argues that one is obligated to obey the state because of the benefits gained
from living within civil society and such benefits would not be possible without the
existence of the state.221 Obedience to the law, then, is our share of the exchange of legal
protection for legal obligations; and were we to live within an orderly society without
recognizing that we are obligated to obey the law, we would be unfairly free-riding on
those who do accept such an obligation.222
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The benefit view is especially attractive because obeying the law seems a
relatively easy burden to bear in exchange for the safety and security of living within an
orderly society. Immediately we see, also, that benefit theory has an advantage over
consent theory on the descriptive adequacy front because whereas few, if any, actually
consent to their governments, quite nearly everyone living in civil society benefits from
political order and others’ obedience to the law. In other words, the benefit view sidesteps
the requirement that citizens register their acceptance of such an obligation; those who
receive certain benefits gained from living within civil society simply owe a debt of
obedience to the state. So the benefit view seems to be a promising explanation for how
most people could be obligated to obey the law.
Now there is a second camp that wishes to defend the concept of political
obligation. However, members of this camp, recognizing the often questionable moral
status of historical transactions between states and citizens,223 locate the basis of political
obligation not in the transactional history, but in some intrinsic connection between
citizen and state. Such theories are called associative accounts of political obligation.
First, those who defend associative accounts, such as Ronald Dworkin, argue that one’s
duty to obey the laws of one’s state derive from the particular role that individuals, as
citizens, play.224 On the associative view, the individual as a member of society is bound
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to obey the state because at least part of what it means to be a member of any group
involves abiding by the rules that govern the group. Furthermore, it is natural for
members of a particular group to desire that their group flourishes and to wish to
contribute to the achievement of their group’s aims. And because, like any other
organization, the success of a state depends upon the cooperation of its members,
citizenship appears to include a duty of obedience to the law.
Second, natural duty accounts of political obligation base the moral duty to obey
the law in some broader moral duty, such as the duty of justice or beneficence. Those
who espouse natural duty accounts, such as John Rawls225 and Jeremy Waldron,226 argue
that fulfilling our natural moral duties, at least in part, requires that we support
institutions that promote corresponding moral principles. So by obeying the laws laid
down by just institutions that apply to us and by working toward creating other just
institutions yet to exist, we fulfill our natural duty to do justice. These accounts rely upon
the simple assumption that one may fulfill a general moral duty by performing particular
moral acts.
Both associative and natural duty accounts have an advantage over transactional
accounts in that the duty to obey the law belongs to citizens in virtue of the type of being
that they are rather than in virtue of the type of action that they take. This allows
associative and natural duty theories to avoid the descriptive inadequacy complaint
because citizens are, in a sense, automatically bound; if it can be shown that the duty to
225
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obey attaches to an essential feature of citizenship or humanity, then that duty must be
universally binding. Also, it is at least initially plausible that membership in a political
community carries with it certain responsibilities toward one’s fellow citizens and that
human beings naturally have certain moral duties, the least of which being a duty to do
justice. But as we shall later see, the anarchist turns these apparent advantages into
liabilities for associative and natural duty accounts. Having now sketched the basic
responses to the descriptive inadequacy objection, I turn, in the following section, to the
daunting challenge posed by skeptics of political obligation.227

IV. The Anarchist Challenge
Descriptive inadequacy is only one challenge for theorists of political obligation
to overcome. But there lurks a weightier challenge from a more formidable opponent.
The anarchist, who remains altogether skeptical of political obligation, agrees that
consent fails because too few citizens actually, intentionally, and voluntarily accept
political obligation; and because he also thinks that consent is the only theoretically
adequate ground for political obligation, he rejects each of the alternative accounts as
well. In this section, I review the anarchist’s challenge to each of the standard approaches
to political obligation and I discuss one attempt to respond to the anarchist. Ultimately, I
suggest that given the persistence of deep theoretical difficulties with other theories of
political oblgation, express consent may actually turn out to be the most promising basis
227
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for political obligation, even despite the charge of descriptive inadequacy. This sets the
stage for an analysis and assessment of my own theory, the natural duty to consent, in the
final section.
The anarchist criticizes both transactional and associative accounts on the basis of
the moral principles each relies upon to justify political obligation. First, transactional
accounts falter because the moral principles invoked are not actually related to particular
transactions between states and individuals. Those who wish to defend the benefit view
of political obligation, for example, do so on the basis of the principle of fair play, which
says that anyone who benefits from participation in a cooperative practice has an
obligation to bear her share of the burdens associated with the practice. Advocates of this
view claim that one’s fair share of participation in the cooperative practice known as civil
society is obedience to the law, but the benefit account encounters a disquieting dilemma.
Either the exchange of benefits for obligation is voluntary or it is non-voluntary. If it is
voluntary, then citizens must be aware of the precise terms of the exchange and it is
difficult to see how the obedience to obey at least some laws directly relates to particular
benefits gained by the law-abiding. But, on the other hand, if the exchange of benefits is
non-voluntary, then it would seem that individuals or institutions could place others
under obligations simply by benefitting them. This certainly seems misguided. Nozick
criticizes the benefit view precisely along these lines. He argues that in order for one to
be obligated because of certain benefits he has gained from another, he first must be
given the right of refusal and, for various reasons already mentioned, this may not be
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possible within the cooperative scheme of civil society.228 So, the receipt of benefits or
conveniences gained by living in civil society does not seem to be enough to ground a
moral obligation to obey the law.
Additionally, anarchists criticize associative theories also for invoking
questionable normative principles. The sort of patriotic feelings that come from being
closely associated with one’s compatriots may stir within us a sense of obligation to the
state, but feeling a sense of obligation ought to be distinguished from actually having
such an obligation. Just as a utilitarian might argue that, in spite of how one might feel,
there is no relevant moral reason to count the well-being of one’s parent or one’s child
above the well-being of any other person, we might argue that nationalism, or the mere
feeling of closeness to one’s compatriots, does not and should not constitute a moral
reason to obey the law. This seems correct especially when we consider the numerous
historical examples of atrocities perpetrated by members of one group upon those deemed
to be outsiders. In addition, were membership sufficient to generate an obligation to obey,
then defenders of associative theories would be forced to accept the unpalatable
conclusion that oppressed group ‘members’ living within unjust nations are obligated to
obey the regime that is oppressing them. This is decidedly not in the spirit of what we
expect a theory of political obligation to explain. Thus, membership, at least nonvoluntary membership, in a particular state is not sufficient to generate an obligation to
obey either.
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The objections raised in opposition to transactional and associative accounts make
it reasonable to reject these approaches229 and to consider another type of approach in the
search for a plausible theory of political obligation. As mentioned above, natural duty
accounts have the advantage of appealing to natural moral duties, such as justice or
beneficence, that belong to human beings not in virtue of their transactional or associative
histories, but in virtue of the sort of beings they are. Hence, if the natural duty theorist
can show that the duty to obey the law derives from one of our natural moral duties, he
immediately avoids worries about connecting moral principles to transactions or
associations. And since not even the anarchist denies that human beings have some nonvoluntary, natural moral duties, this seems not a bad place to start. Still, though defenders
of natural duty accounts may have an advantage on this point, natural duty theories
certainly are not without their own difficulties.
The most troublesome objection to this approach is the particularity requirement.
Simmons raises this objection arguing that any theory of political obligation relying upon
the natural duty of justice must explain not only why we have an obligation to support
just institutions, but why we have an obligation to support a particular just institution,
i.e., our own state, because the obligation to obey the law is a special obligation owed to
a particular group rather than to humanity in general.230 Even if one grants that we have
natural moral duties and even if supporting and complying with just institutions is one
229
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valid way to satisfy our natural moral duties, those duties do not seem to require that we
support and comply with any particular political institution. For example, why should we
think that I am failing to fulfill my natural duty of justice if instead of sending a fair share
of my income to the IRS, I send it to some other equally just nonpolitical institution? In
short, there are numerous ways to fulfill our natural duty to do justice besides obeying the
(just) laws of the United States. But, claims the anarchist, it is precisely this type of
special bond between community and citizen that theories of political obligation must
account for.
One account of political obligation that attempts to respond to Simmons’s
particularity requirement is Wellman’s samaritanism.231 This hybrid view combines a
natural duty account with a fairness theory. According to Wellman, the natural duty of
justice fails to meet the anarchist’s objection because the value of justice “lacks the
urgency necessary to empower others to create institutions that unilaterally bind us.”232
However, if there were an alternative natural duty that was sufficiently urgent and
relevant to the question of political obligation, it would better serve as a basis for political
obligation. That natural duty, Wellman argues, is a duty of beneficence or what he calls
samaritan duties: our duties to rescue others from harm when such assistance is not
unreasonably burdensome. Further, because the state is in a unique position to rescue
many from the dangers of the state of nature and because the state is only in such a
231
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position so long as there is a system of political order in place, citizens have a duty to
obey the laws of their state as their fair share of the contribution to that invaluable
political order.233
Now

Wellman

believes

samaritanism

satisfies

Simmons’s

particularity

requirement because political stability is the only just way to avoid the dangers of the
state of nature and political stability is not something that any one individual can achieve
in isolation; it requires the social cooperation of those living in one place.234 As a citizen
of the United States, then, I have a special duty to obey the laws of the U.S., and not any
other just political system, because only the U.S. federal government is in a position to
help me fulfill my samaritan duties. Consequently, I cannot simply choose to send my tax
money to Oxfam because the burden of paying my income tax to the IRS is my share of
the United States citizens’ collective duty to save others from the perils of the state of
nature. And that burden includes allowing the government to limit my discretion about
which political and non-political institutions I might support.235
While I agree that samaritanism has advantages over pure natural duty of justice
accounts, I maintain that it too falls short of answering the anarchist’s challenge.
Understanding samaritanism’s shortcomings, though, first requires setting out an
important distinction: there is a crucial difference between a state wielding moral
authority over its constituents and a state justifiably coercing its constituents. In order for
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a state to have moral authority and correlatively, for citizens to have an independent
moral obligation to obey the law, the duties invoked must be owed to the state directly.
Otherwise, the state is merely justified in coercing its citizens to fulfill duties that they
owe to others. This distinction marks the crucial point of disagreement between the
anarchist and the proponent of political obligation. While Simmons and Wellman can
both agree that we all have samaritan duties and that avoiding the severe threat posed by
the dangers of the state of nature requires political order and even that the existence of the
state is necessary to bring about political order,236 they can and do also disagree about
what follows from their acceptance of these propositions. According to Simmons, the
above amount to the state having a strong, perhaps even an extremely strong, justification
for coercing its citizens; they do not, however, result in the state having moral authority
or citizens having political obligation, as Wellman contends.
The problem is that Wellman thinks the urgency of avoiding the perils of the state
of nature combined with the principle of fairness and his claim that no single individual
can fulfill her moral obligation to rescue others, without the existence of a strong state,
gives the state moral authority.237 However, that the state plays an instrumental role, even
perhaps an urgent instrumental role, in my fulfillment of one of my moral duties does not
also give me a moral obligation to obey the state. Though obedience to the state happens
to be practically necessary for the performance of my duty to rescue, it remains
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theoretically only incidental to my fulfillment of my moral duty because even urgent
moral duties, such as the duty to rescue, are owed to the individuals who are potentially at
risk and not to the state itself. My duty is to rescue others and that I could fulfill that duty
without, at least intending to fulfill an additional moral duty to obey the state (e.g., by
complying with the law for purely prudential reasons) calls into question the independent
moral authority of the state.238 In other words, facilitating justice is not enough to give the
state moral authority, though it may justify the state’s use of its coercive power.
To illustrate this point, take as an analogy the following example. In the novel,
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, by Robert Louis Stevenson,239 Dr. Jekyll discovers a potion by
which he transforms himself into a sinister creature, Mr. Hyde. At first, he enjoys the
moral freedom the metamorphosis affords him, but eventually Jekyll begins
spontaneously turning into Hyde, even without taking the potion, and he vows never to
intentionally become Hyde again. One night, though, the urge overtakes him and after the
transformation, Hyde violently kills Sir Danvers Carew.
Now suppose that Jekyll, rather than passively writing a letter detailing his
desperate cry for help, which he knew would be found only after his death, had instead
238
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explained everything to his butler, Mr. Poole. Then suppose further that he had asked Mr.
Poole, in the event of a spontaneous transformation, to restrain Hyde until his assistant
were able to deliver the antidote and transform him back into the benevolent Jekyll. In
my alternative ending, Jekyll has an urgent duty not to harm others and the only way for
him to fulfill that duty is to enlist the help of Mr. Poole. Poole then acquires moral
authority over Hyde through Jekyll’s consent. But without his consent, things would be
different. Poole would be merely justified in coercing Hyde (e.g., by tying him up)
because Jekyll’s unfortunate predicament alone is not enough to invest Poole with
increased moral authority. Jekyll has a moral duty to others not to harm them, but he does
not also have a duty to obey Poole unless he first consents.240 In the same way, the moral
duty that I owe to my compatriots may justify the state having the power to legislate
behavior because of the cooperative scheme in which we find ourselves, but it does not
give the state independent moral authority.
The supposedly fatal charge of descriptive inadequacy raised against consent
theory is born of a worry about anarchism: accepting a theory of political obligation that
cannot explain how the majority of citizens are obligated to obey their states certainly
cannot respond to a theory that denies that individuals have such an obligation. However,
in focusing upon descriptive inadequacy, the alternative theories fail to respond to the
anarchist’s stronger theoretical objections. The largely unsuccessful campaign waged by
defenders of political obligation force us to admit that further work defending political
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obligation is needed. And because I agree that all of the contemporary accounts have
deep theoretical flaws, I propose, in the following section, that we revoke the dismissal of
consent on the grounds of descriptive inadequacy and instead, face the objection straight
on taking consent seriously as a theory of political obligation once again.

V. The Case for the Natural Duty to Consent
In the previous section, I established that natural duty accounts have a distinct
advantage over other non-voluntary approaches to political obligation. Nevertheless,
because of the tough challenges from the anarchist, I ruled out two candidates for
particular natural duties upon which to build a theory of political obligation: Rawls’s
natural duty of justice and Wellman’s samaritan duties. In fact, I doubt that any nonvoluntary account of political obligation could satisfy the anarchist. What the anarchist
requires of the defender of political obligation is a “suitably general” moral principle, for
instance, a natural duty, which could provide a special obligation binding all individuals
living within a particular state to obey the laws of that state. If this is what is truly
required to establish a moral duty to obey the law, anarchism is clearly the only
reasonable option, since it seems obvious that no general moral principle could ever meet
the particularity requirement. But I think there is one final move available to the weary
defender of political obligation, combining a general moral duty with a voluntaristic
account of political obligation. If we can show that there is a natural duty to voluntarily
accept an obligation to obey a particular state, we can meet Simmons’s particularity
requirement and successfully explain the moral obligation to obey the law. In this final
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section, I show how my reinterpretation of Locke’s consent theory of political obligation
based upon the natural moral duty to consent, which I defended in chapter four, responds
to the anarchist challenge and supports the idea that individuals have a moral duty to
obey the law.

My Lockeian theory has several advantages over other theories of political
obligation. First, it clarifies the relationship between citizen and state. The state is in a
unique moral position with respect to us, as Rawls and Wellman, among others, rightly
recognize. In addition to the obvious social, cultural, and financial benefits, the state
provides moral benefits; for instance, it is in a position to help us to fulfill our duties
toward others, as Wellman’s argument for samaritanism demonstrates. Another important
moral benefit provided by the state is avoidance of injustices that occur purely out of a
lack of social cooperation and epistemic disputes. Perhaps the best illustration of the
state’s power in this regard is in the case of natural disasters. During these emergencies,
if there is not a unified centralized authority making decisions and disseminating
information, massive numbers of casualties will occur purely as a result of confusion
caused by the lack of information distribution and cooperation. Additionally, there are
other times when the moral action to take is not always immediately obvious. While
common sense and the light of reason can often allow us to discern the action that will
satisfy our natural moral duties, there are many cases in which the action prescribed by
our duty not to harm others is not so obvious, for example, discerning the appropriate
speed limit on a particular road. Thus, the state, unlike other entities with less broad-
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reaching power, such as individuals or private associations, is in the right position to be
able to prevent these sorts of harms.
Furthermore, as I mentioned in the preceding chapter, the state offers the
opportunity to settle disputes more fairly by providing an impartial judge and a legal
system ensuring that the punishment for failing to fulfill one’s obligations is justly carried
out. Contrast this with Locke’s description of the state of nature in which all individuals
have the executive right to judge and enforce punishment upon those who wrong
others.241 Having a uniform system in place governed by an authoritative body, at the
least, offers greater potential to uphold the values of fairness and equality by preventing
the worst consequences of partiality, such as vigilantism and mob rule. Hence, it seems
that entering into civil society gives individuals more opportunities to uphold certain
values and to fulfill certain moral duties.
However, as I illustrated with the Jekyll and Hyde example above, this important
or even urgent moral role that the state plays is not enough to give it moral authority.
Though I think I have a natural moral duty to leave the state of nature because I have a
natural moral duty, which I owe to those who might be affected by my actions, to do
whatever is in my power to prevent failures of moral rationality or to benefit them in
whatever way is not unfairly burdensome to me, an additional step is required to give me
a moral duty to obey the state.242 As I made the case for in chapter three, the capacity for
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Thus, the difference between my view and Wellman’s view is that while I think individuals are bound
to discharge their samaritan duties, that fact alone is not sufficient to give the state moral authority. Even if
we add in the principle of fairness, this is still a duty owed to other individuals and not directly to the state.
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justice combined with the freedom to choose good over evil (i.e., the combination of
rationality and autonomy) gives human beings natural moral authority. Moral authority
belongs to individual human beings naturally because they can exercise this authority
apart from the laws of civil government and because ultimate moral authority rests with
the individual even within civil society, the state gains moral authority only when
individuals voluntarily agree to accept certain limits to their autonomy through consent.
Yet, though one retains discretion in choosing to consent, one’s exercise of autonomy is
not utterly free from moral restraint. Indeed, as I have emphasized throughout, freedom
and obedience to the natural moral law are continually competing values for Locke.
Therefore, although the notion that the state provides more and better opportunities for
individuals to fulfill their natural moral duties does not quite justify a direct duty to obey
the state, it can ground a duty to consent, i.e., a general duty to support just institutions,
which requires my voluntarily acquiring a moral duty to obey the law.
Perhaps the most important reason that individuals ought to consent to their states,
though, is because the duty not to harm others requires that individuals demonstrate a
willingness to obey the law. Like Ulysses, they tie themselves to the mast in consenting
to the state; and in so doing they gain the trust of and increase the security of those
around them. As I argue in the preceding chapter, Locke’s consent theory of political
obligation ought to be modified to show that he is also committed to there being a natural
duty to consent and I think that this duty is the key to any successful theory of political
obligation. It is the natural duty to consent, which best respects autonomy, by allowing
individuals to voluntarily incur an obligation to obey a particular state, while at the same
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time recognizing the duties that citizens owe to one another because it makes the
responsibility to accept the authority of a particular government part of what we owe to
one another. Thus, individuals have a natural duty to transfer moral authority to the state,
which they owe to their fellow citizens.
By now my response to the anarchist should be clear. Mine is a thoroughly
voluntaristic theory meaning that one is bound to obey the state only if one consents to
obey. It is consent that binds because although I argue that one has a natural duty to
consent, the obligation to a particular state comes only when one voluntarily transfers
some part of his moral authority to that state. In addition, the voluntarism of the natural
duty to consent meets the particularity requirement. Because consent requires directly
transferring moral authority to a particular state, it explains the deep connection between
the individual and her community. Finally, consent gives the state moral authority, rather
than merely justifying its coercion. Again, when individuals consent, they directly
transfer moral authority to a particular state; in other words, they agree to give up some
of their independent moral authority to that state.
As a consequence of my theory of political obligation, the state has no moral
authority over those who do not voluntarily consent, but the state is justified in coercing
non-consenting individuals in the service of the common good. So while I admit what
many other contemporary theorists of political obligation are afraid to admit, namely, that
under the status quo a majority of individuals are not morally obligated to obey the law, I
do not think that such an admission gives the game away to the anarchist. Though the
vast majority of individuals are not morally obligated to obey the law due to their lack of
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consenting, it is not true that they ought not be so obligated. I suppose my position could
be characterized as conditional anarchy, to borrow an adjective from the just war
literature. Like conditional pacifists, who oppose war on the grounds that though it is
theoretically possible to wage a just war, the loss of innocent lives that has been endemic
of all actual wars makes it practically impossible, I argue that though very few, if any,
actually manage to meet the standard of political obligation set by consent theory, there is
no reason to disregard such a standard altogether.
Lastly, I address two objections to my view. First, I seem not only to have opened
the door for descriptive inadequacy, but also to have embraced it like one would embrace
a long-lost child. Consent simply cannot explain how the majority of citizens are bound
to obey the law because a majority of citizens have never had the opportunity to consent
to their governments. However, this objection is not as strong as it initially seems.
First, people do have the opportunity to consent to their governments in limited
ways. For example, when one appears at the DMV to receive a drivers’ license, he has
the opportunity to consent to obey the traffic laws of his state. Also, when individuals
participate in local government by becoming members of the school board, for instance,
they demonstrate their willingness to obey the rules of their district, or at least their
willingness to work within the system to change the rules with which they disagree.
Another opportunity to display one’s acceptance of political obligation is through
voluntary enlistment in the military or other nonmilitary civil service organizations.243 In
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Although some would argue that the disproportionately high number of poor people and minorities who
join the military in the U.S. casts doubt upon the claim that it is truly voluntary, I do think most who enlist
take themselves to be choosing to do so, thus accepting the obligation to obey a particular set of rules.
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these and similar examples, the individuals who participate in these aspects of their
governments understand that they are bound to obey particular rules as a direct result of
their participation. Thus, I think that the state has limited moral authority at least in these
and other cases while operating under the status quo.
Still, the strongest version of the descriptive inadequacy objection need not deny
that people consent in such ways, but only that this is sufficient to bind them generally to
obey the state or that this is sufficient to bind most people. Basically, opponents of
consent theory argue that there is simply no social contract between modern citizens and
their states. Recall that the reasons for this are primarily that, unlike the original parties to
the contract of whom Locke speaks, modern citizens have no say over the form of their
governments and that due to the hardships of leaving home, modern citizens lack exit
options. So even if they have fundamental disagreements with the structure of their
governments, they have no real ability to challenge the foundation upon which their states
were built and they have no chance to register their dissent by voting with their feet, so to
speak. The objection is not that individuals do not ever have opportunities to consent, but
that they do not have the opportunity to consent in the right way—the way that would
bind them to obey the state.
My response to the strong form of descriptive inadequacy follows. First, there is
an ambiguity in the idea that there is no social contract between modern citizens and their
states. Either the objector is making a theoretical claim: it is not possible to create a social
contract under the conditions that actually obtain; or he is making a descriptive claim:
people simply do not consent under the conditions that obtain. If he means the former, the
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objection is false. If, after due consideration, one recognizes the justice of one’s state and
accepts the state’s laws, then there is no need to have the opportunity to change the form
of one’s government or to exit from one’s state. It is possible to consent if such a
situation obtains. If, on the other hand, he means the latter descriptive claim, I grant that
he is correct that currently few individuals consent to their governments. However, I fail
to see how this might be an objection to my view because the descriptive fact that
individuals do not consent does not mean that they ought not. I doubt seriously that the
majority of those who do not accept the state’s moral authority consider themselves so
free because of some philosophical position or that they have ever actually given it much
thought at all. I think the more likely cause is simply apathy toward the system. While
apathy is a serious problem, it does not preclude more motivated individuals from
consenting. And were there a sufficient number of individuals refusing to consent on such
philosophical grounds, they would be justified in protesting, seceding, or revolting; in
which case, they would have the opportunity to form a more perfect union to which they
actually consent.
The second objection questions whether the natural duty to consent is
superfluous: if the state is justified in coercing individuals who refuse to consent, then
does not a duty to consent reduce to a duty to obey the state? What real work is consent
doing in my theory that an ordinary natural duty of justice binding one to obey the state
cannot do? First, I go some distance toward forestalling this objection when I show that a
state being justified in coercing its citizens ought to be distinguished from a state having
moral authority over its citizens. So when I say that the state is justified in coercing those
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who do not consent, I do not also mean to imply that the state is justified because
individuals have a moral duty to obey. The state is justified in coercing those who fail to
consent because it is acting as an instrument of the citizens to whom non-consenters do
have a genuine moral obligation. Also, the state has an obligation to protect those who
have consented to its authority and it must do so by punishing those who fail to comply
with the law.
Further, consenting to obey the state is not equivalent to agreeing to comply with
the law. Whereas one may be forced to comply with the law, obedience requires the
freedom to understand and evaluate the law for oneself before choosing whether to
consent. Yet, this does not give one the absolute freedom to consent to some laws and not
to others because once one consents to a state or a system of laws, if she disagrees with a
particular law, she must register her dissent through protesting or some other means. But
it is in the flexibility needed for personal autonomy that consent does the heavy lifting.
Consent allows individuals to retain their natural right to autonomy while fulfilling their
natural duty to obey the moral law.

VI. Conclusion
Despite the nearly universal disregard for consent theory in the contemporary
debate regarding political obligation, there are some credible reasons to return to the idea.
First, consent theory is intuitively appealing and the purest form of political obligation.
Consent is intuitively appealing because, of all the theories of political obligation, it best
respects the autonomy of individual human beings and it provides a straightforward
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standard for evaluating political obligation. Secondly, the consent account is theoretically
adequate or at least it raises the standard of theoretical adequacy on the other accounts.
Consent is theoretically adequate because the moral principle invoked, i.e., that one ought
to keep one’s promises, is valid. If one transfers moral authority and the choice to do so is
sufficiently autonomous, then there is no doubt that he is bound; not even the anarchist
denies this. Therefore, if I have been successful at showing that individuals have moral
reasons to consent and that it is theoretically possible for them to do so, then there can be
no doubt that they are morally obligated to obey the law.
In the previous chapter, I challenge the standard reading of Locke’s consent
theory of political obligation and I offer my own interpretation, which emphasizes
Locke’s use of the natural law as a limit to his political voluntarism. Consent is not
merely a prudent means of avoiding the inconveniences of the state of nature, but rather
individuals have a natural moral duty to leave the state of nature, which they owe to those
with whom they associate, and consent is the vehicle through which they must fulfill that
duty. Once they have consented, they then have a moral duty to obey the laws of a
particular state. In this final chapter, I have shown, at the very least, that the natural duty
to consent stands as a formidable contender in the debate concerning political obligation
and that Locke has something important to say to contributors to the contemporary
debate.
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Conclusions
I said at the outset that Locke’s theories of moral and political obligation are
instructive both in their successes and in their failures. Now, I want to take stock and
offer some concluding remarks about exactly what I see as instructive in these theories.
First, I think it is fair to say that both Locke’s early natural law theory and his later
consent theory of political obligation are successful in their vision, but fail in their
execution. I think that although Locke has many important ideas that continue to
influence contemporary philosophers in fields from metaphysics to political theory,
virtually all of those ideas could have been more detailed and more carefully explained
and his theory of obligation is no exception. The ambiguities in many of Locke’s works
are equally frustrating and fascinating as fertile ground for interpretation. Nonetheless,
one gets the sense that Locke certainly put his finger on many important philosophical
puzzles and did manage to articulate problems that had not been previously articulated,
which, in itself, is a valuable service for posterity.
Concerning his natural law theory, Locke ought to be commended for recognizing
that the theological natural law theory associated with the Scholastics could never satisfy
the moral skeptic and for being aware that any natural law theory that aims to be widely
accepted must begin from ground that is as morally neutral as possible. Although the
influence of Locke’s natural law predecessors is evident in much of his work, he uses
elements of many different theories to create a unique view of his own. Unfortunately, it
is tough to see how such a piecemeal theory could manage to be consistent. Though, as I
argued in chapter three, I do not think a plausible natural law theory could be built upon
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data given to us from raw sense experience alone, I also think that a theory of moral
obligation completely divorced from human nature and the experiences of human beings
is bound to fail. So, Locke’s empiricism does have a lesson to teach us about moral
obligation.
Additionally, Locke’s natural law theory revolves around two main questions: (1)
an epistemological one, how human beings come to know the moral law and (2) a
normative one, what gives this law its binding force. Although Locke fails to answer both
questions well, he does seem to be asking the right ones. Any credible theory of moral
obligation must begin from a rationalist foundation, such as Kant’s rational
demonstration of the Formula of Humanity, and from that general moral principle of
respecting humanity combined with ordinary experiences it is possible to discover more
specific moral rules that constitute the application of the natural moral law. I also think
there is something to the idea that morality is intuitive and knowable in most cases
through common sense. Human beings are essentially rational, and though human nature
is difficult to define precisely, Locke is right to point out that there is a particular element
of our nature that leads us to evaluate the world in a normative way. Finally, Locke hints
at moral realism as the justification for the claims that morality makes upon us and I think
any credible solution to the problem of normativity must be a realist position.
Regarding political obligation, though the traditional consent theory view has
received some well-deserved criticism, it has demonstrated remarkable staying power.
Also, since all other theories of political obligation receive at least as much, if not more,
valid criticism, I think Locke’s consent theory is worth another look. Despite the nearly
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universal disregard for consent theory in the contemporary debate concerning political
obligation, there are some credible reasons to return to the idea. First, consent theory is
intuitively appealing and the purest form of political obligation. Consent is intuitively
appealing because, of all the theories of political obligation, it best respects the autonomy
of individual human beings and it provides a straightforward standard for evaluating
political obligation. Secondly, the consent account is theoretically adequate or at least it
raises the standard of theoretical adequacy on the other accounts. Consent is theoretically
adequate because the moral principle invoked, i.e., that one ought to keep one’s promises,
is valid. If one transfers moral authority and the choice to do so is sufficiently
autonomous, then there is no doubt that he is bound; not even the anarchist denies this.
Therefore, if I have been successful at showing that individuals have moral reasons to
consent and that it is theoretically possible for them to do so, then there can be no doubt
that they are morally obligated to obey the law. So I think Locke was right to pursue
consent as the justification for the moral duty to obey the law.
Also, I hope that I have shown that, with some very reasonable clarifications,
Locke’s consent theory is a formidable contender in the contemporary political obligation
debate. Consent is not merely a prudent means of avoiding the inconveniences of the
state of nature, but rather individuals have a natural moral duty to leave the state of
nature, which they owe to those with whom they associate, and consent is the vehicle
through which they must fulfill that duty. Without the existence of civil laws and the
prevalence of those who are competent to derive civil laws from the natural law, most
would be incapable of exercising justice except, perhaps, by accident. Therefore, there is
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a natural moral duty to consent that will allow ordinary individuals to fulfill their moral
obligations and placing this limit upon consent makes Locke’s theory of political
obligation more palatable. I think consent is the most promising place to look for an
adequate response to the anarchist challenge. Therefore, Locke has something important
to say to contributors to the contemporary debate.
I hope I have given voice to some helpful responses to the toughest of Locke’s
critics. More work needs to be done to explain the relationship between natural duties and
natural rights, but something like Locke’s doctrine of limited natural rights seems to be
the right place to begin in constructing a plausible political theory. At the very least, I
think I have demonstrated that though incomplete, Locke’s theories of moral and political
obligation offer valuable insight into the way in which human beings come to know their
moral and political obligations and how they might be bound to obey the moral law and
the laws of their own political institutions.
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